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INTRODUCTION
Electronic discovery presents unique problems during litigation. It
often involves a broad search of files by the opposing side and may
impose a high risk to potentially privileged information due to the
1
depth of information residing on computer systems. Additionally,
the producing party cannot simply turn over the data as is, and often
2
must create programming to retrieve discoverable information. The
sheer volume and complexity of data involved with electronic
discovery impose significant burdens on the producing party and
present challenges to judges interpreting the impact of technology
access requests. Existing jurisprudence is unclear regarding when
parties producing electronic data during discovery may shift the cost
burden to the requesting party for the retrieval, production, and
3
review of electronic evidence. The lack of clarity is exacerbated by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules”), which offer
4
minimal guidance regarding electronic discovery.
1. See Mark D. Robins, Computers and the Discovery of Evidence: A New Dimension to
Civil Procedure, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 411, 421 (1999) (deeming
computer systems a potential gold mine for the discovering party and potential mine
field for the producing party, as they may reveal damaging information and
confidential material such as trade secrets, communications with counsel, and other
privileged information).
2. See infra Part I.B (comparing the unique differences between electronic and
traditional discovery).
3. Electronic evidence pertains to “electronically-stored information subject to
pre-trial discovery.” Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in
Federal Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 332-33 (2000)
(suggesting “electronic document” refers to a type of electronic evidence
“intentionally created by a computer user and stored in electronic form”); see, e.g.,
RICHARD A. LAZAR, THE GUIDE TO ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: HOW TO NAVIGATE THE
PROCESS OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY 1 (2002) (defining
electronic discovery as the “collection, preparation, review[,] and distribution of
electronic documents”); MICHAEL R. OVERLY, OVERLY ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN
CALIFORNIA § 1.01, at 2 (2002) (defining electronic evidence as “information stored
in electronic form . . . that is relevant to the issues in a particular litigation”).
4. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 3, at 330 (observing that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure make only slight reference to electronic evidence and
provide no guidance regarding the discovery of e-mail). But see Robert F. Carangelo
& Gina M. Graham, Passing the Buck: Cost-Shifting in Electronic Discovery, 50 FED. LAW.
35 (2003) (noting that electronic discovery is a regular part of discovery under the
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This Comment explores the economic, political, and social impact
5
of cost-shifting during electronic discovery by examining the
6
decision in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC. The conclusion suggests
that Zubulake unduly limits judicial discretion during electronic
discovery disputes, as the rule eliminates accessible data from the
universe of information subject to a cost-shifting analysis. The new
threshold test articulated in Zubulake based on inaccessibility fails to
consider the burden this limitation will have on forced settlements
and unfair requests. The corresponding result will require corporate
counsel to craft document management practices and processes with
an eye for expense reduction by making files easier to retrieve and
discover during litigation.
Part I provides background regarding the applicable rules
regulating discovery, existing jurisprudence regarding electronic
discovery disputes, and considers the type of factors that may trigger a
cost shift to the requesting party. Part II provides a comparative
7
analysis of the undue burden test in the context of electronic
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as the Rules require the production of all
documents, including electronic documents). See also Mary Kay Brown & Paul D.
Weiner, Digital Dangers: A Primer On Electronic Evidence in the Wake of Enron, 30 LITIG.
24, 25 (2003) (suggesting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure evolve as technology
changes and that electronic documents are subject to discovery according to Rule
34).
5. See, e.g., Marnie H. Pulver, Note, Electronic Media Discovery: The Economic
Benefit of Pay-Per-View, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1379, 1386 (2000) (examining from an
economic perspective the cost benefit analysis regarding the maintenance and
improvement of information systems versus bearing the costs to retrieve); The New
“New” Economy: How Real and How Durable Are America’s Extraordinary Gains in
Productivity?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 13, 2003, at 64 [hereinafter Productivity] (explaining
that productivity improvements from information technology investment may boost
efficiencies across the organization from design to accounting and across multiple
sectors). Additionally, implementing technology improvements for the purpose of
making documents more accessible could reduce more than just litigation expenses.
See discussion infra Part III.D. In addition to economic utility, cost-shifting impacts
the political system of the judiciary. See Ronald Braeutigam et al., An Economic
Analysis of Alternate Fee Shifting Systems, 47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 174 (1984)
(suggesting that requiring the judiciary to determine what fees to shift and what fees
are reasonable would be time consuming and burden judicial administration). But
see William H. Wagener, Note, Modeling the Effect of One-Way Fee Shifting on Discovery
Abuse in Private Antitrust Litigation, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1887, 1915 (2003) (suggesting
that limiting the applicability of cost-shifting hinders the adversarial system of the
judiciary since the limitation increases settlement incentives). Finally, the social
policy implications of cost-shifting in electronic discovery may come at the expense
of civil justice. See Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714,
718 (1967) (arguing that the poor should not be unjustly discouraged from
vindicating their rights by having to incur penalties for defending or prosecuting an
action). A plaintiff unable to pay for the discovery of information may have better
access to courts and a better ability to adjudicate where cost-shifting is limited. Id.
6. 217 F.R.D. 309, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (limiting cost-shifting during electronic
discovery where data is relatively inaccessible).
7. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (noting that a court may protect a
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discovery announced in Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. The William Morris
8
Agency and the new Zubulake inaccessibility requirement. This
Comment suggests that the new Zubulake rule, hailing from the same
court that issued Rowe, departs from the undue burden analysis and
will likely have a compelling impact and guide other courts’ legal
9
analyses. While the Zubulake court’s decision is not binding on the
10
federal courts, other federal courts increasingly rely on Zubulake as a
11
guide for determining cost allocation during electronic discovery.
Finally, Part III applies the new Zubulake test and suggests the impact
the limitation will have on both corporate counsel and information
technology departments. Part III also provides recommendations
regarding useful data management techniques to ultimately manage
litigation costs.
I.

BEARING THE BURDEN OF COSTS IN ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY

Electronic information is implicitly discoverable under the Federal
12
Rules.
The rationale for including electronic sources with
traditional forms of documents is that the electronic files contain
13
discoverable information in an evolved format. As a result, the same
general rules that govern traditional discovery of documents also

responding party from “undue burden” or expense by shifting the costs of
production to the requesting party).
8. 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (permitting cost-shifting during electronic
discovery based on an imbalance of burdens on the producing party to retrieve
electronic files versus the benefits to the requesting party of obtaining the electronic
data).
9. The Southern District of New York helps guide federal circuit decisions
regarding electronic discovery disputes vis-à-vis cost-shifting. See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v.
William Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (containing the test for
determining burden that became the new gold standard for cost-shifting in
electronic discovery disputes); see also Robert W. Hamilton, The State of State
Corporation Law, 11 DEL. J. CORP. L. 3, 16 (1986) (finding that corporate law matters
related to federal securities were predominately brought in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, suggesting expertise in complex corporate litigation).
10. See Jonathan M. Redgrave & Erica J. Bachmann, Ripples on the Shores of
Zubulake: Practice Considerations from Recent Electronic Discovery Decisions, 50 FED. LAW.
31, 33 (2003) (reminding counsel that Zubulake is not binding on federal courts
other than the Southern District of New York and that some courts may find the
accessibility standard too limiting).
11. See infra note 227 and accompanying text.
12. See Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 461 (D. Utah 1985) (stating “[i]t
is now axiomatic that electronically stored information is discoverable under Rule 34
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” and denying the request to shift costs for the
production of computer data).
13. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94 CIV.2120, 1995 WL 649934, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995) (noting that the description of documents is revised with
changing technology and inherently includes electronic data compilations made
clear by Rule 34).
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14

govern electronic discovery. However, electronic evidence retains
15
Consequently, courts may follow
unique challenges and costs.
different protocols when examining whether and when to shift the
16
costs of electronic document production to the requesting party.
Nevertheless, courts remain steadfast to the traditional rules and
typically adopt the presumption that each party should bear its own
17
costs for discovery.
A. General Rules Regulating Electronic Discovery
18

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 34, Federal Rules of Civil
19
20
Procedure 26, and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1
play a
significant role during electronic discovery by offering guidance
regarding how to allocate costs during litigation. The interplay of
these rules requires a balancing process to determine who bears the
costs of electronic discovery when the facts suggest the burden of
21
producing files outweighs the benefit.
In general, judicial discretion to control discovery is available to
22
relieve congested dockets and avoid spiraling litigation costs. Judges
have Rule 1 within their arsenal as a tool available to control litigation
23
costs. However, as states began to adopt the Federal Rules and as
courts interpreted the rules, the mandate for “just, speedy and
24
inexpensive” adjudication under Rule 1 played less of a role since

14. See infra Part I.A (describing the foundations of electronic discovery).
15. See infra Part I.B (outlining the differences between electronic and traditional
discovery).
16. See infra Part I.B (discussing cost-shifting as a function of a court’s specific
interpretation of the facts combined with the practicality of retrieving the
information).
17. See infra Part I.C (summarizing the origins of cost-shifting and describing the
courts’ struggles with finding an equitable solution).
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 34.
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
20. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
21. See Jonathan M. Redgrave, The Sedona Conference Working Group on Electronic
Document Retention and Production, 4 SEDONA CONF. J. 197, 204 (2003) (balancing cost
allocation by interpreting Rule 34 to encourage broad discovery of documents and
things applied in light of the cost-benefit analysis discussed in FED. R. CIV. P. 1, 26).
22. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2003) (noting that the Judicial Conference of the United
States has the obligation to simplify, ensure fairness in administration, and eliminate
unjust expense and inefficiency); FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee notes (1993)
(adding the word “administered” to Rule 1 recognizes the affirmative duty of the
courts to resolve civil litigation in a fair manner that avoids undue cost or delay).
23. See Calpetco 1981 v. Marshall Exploration, Inc., 989 F.2d 1408, 1415 (5th Cir.
1993) (citing Rule 1 that empowers the court to control lengthy and arduous
litigation and ultimately decide when “enough is enough”).
24. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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internal operating procedures often sacrificed the economies of
25
uniformity.
Courts often cite to Rule 1 along with Rule 26 when discussing
26
limitations during discovery. The scope of discovery is broad under
27
the Federal Rules, and parties may obtain any relevant information
“reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
28
evidence.”
Under Rule 26, litigants may find protection from
29
annoying, embarrassing, oppressive, or unduly expensive discovery.
Courts may adhere to a totality of the circumstances test to determine
30
whether or not to restrict discovery.
When litigants use discovery tools as weapons rather than to expose
the truth, this imposes significant costs on the judicial system and
31
impedes justice. In general, however, judges are reluctant to limit
the use of discovery since the material may serve a truth seeking
32
function and any limitations may hinder the adversarial process.
In addition to the broad scope of discovery generally permitted
under Rule 26, there are no boundaries on the number of
33
documents that may be requested under Rule 34. By contrast, the
Federal Rules impose limits on the number of interrogatories or
34
depositions permitted under Rule 30. Similar to Rule 26, under
25. See Susan J. Becker, Discovery of Information and Documents from a Litigant’s
Former Employees: Synergy and Synthesis of Civil Rules, Ethical Standards, Privilege Doctrines,
and Common Law Principles, 81 NEB. L. REV. 868, 917-18 (2003) (suggesting that the
goal of efficiency and uniformity faded after states adopted the Federal Rules
subsequent to Congressional promulgation of the Federal Rules).
26. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979); accord Jackson v. County of
Sacramento, 175 F.R.D. 653, 658 (E.D. Cal. 1997) (using Rule 1 to limit the scope of
discovery where there is undue expense); see also Reed v. Binder, 165 F.R.D. 424,
428 (D.N.J. 1996) (indicating that Rule 1 requires cost-shifting where economic
obstacles hinder plaintiffs from redressing rights and imposing limitation on
discovery).
27. See Stagman v. Ryan, 176 F.3d 986, 993-94 (7th Cir. 1999) (indicating that
discovery is broad and may even be expanded by the court to include additional
sources not referred to by the party seeking discovery).
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
29. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
30. See Rowlin v. Alabama, 200 F.R.D. 459, 461 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (placing a limit
on discovery after finding that, based on the “the totality of the circumstances,” the
cost and time needed to provide the information outweighs the value of the material
sought and societal interest). Furthermore, the “truthseeking” function of the
material requested in some cases may weigh in favor of permitting discovery. Id.
31. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee notes (1983) (explaining that
abusive discovery practices resulting from the broad nature of discovery violates the
spirit of the rules).
32. See id.; Apco Oil Co. v. Certified Transp., Inc., 46 F.R.D. 428 (W.D. Mo. 1969)
(noting the importance of maintaining an adversarial system and restraining
discovery limits).
33. FED. R. CIV. P. 34.
34. A comparative analysis of the amendment history of Rule 34 against Rule 30
indicates that Rule 34 does not provide a limitation on the number of documents
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Rule 34 litigants may defend against document discovery requests
that are too general, cause undue burden, or contain ambiguous
35
Parties producing documents must also abide by the
requests.
general rules of document discovery and engage in fair play by
36
presenting documents for inspection in an organized manner.
With the advent of technology in the digital age, the existing rules
may not address the unique problems inherent in electronic
37
discovery.
The Federal Rules include reference to electronic
discovery. Rule 34 expressly provides for electronic evidence to be
38
included as discoverable material and the advisory committee notes
39
suggest that the term “documents” evolves as technology changes.
Additionally, Rule 34(b) governs the particularity of the discovering
party’s request, in part to avoid an overbroad request but also to
40
ensure that a basis exists for finding relevant information. However,
electronic discovery inevitably involves more information and
41
exponentially increases the exposure to irrelevant information.
The complexity embedded within the electronic discovery process
has led to a growing concern that the underlying scope of the Federal
Rules in Rule 1, to ensure “just, speedy, and inexpensive”
permitted whereas Rule 30 includes new limits on the number of depositions
permitted. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory committee notes (1993) (including a new
limit on the number of depositions and citing purpose of limitation to encourage
counsel to create a cost-effective discovery plan during adjudication).
35. See Stiller v. Arnold, 167 F.R.D. 68, 71 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (noting the
prohibition of discovery requests used to harass or increase litigation costs).
36. See id. (placing an obligation on producing parties to “organize and label”
documents or face the consequences of sanctions).
37. See infra note 63 and accompanying text (considering amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for issues specific to electronic discovery).
38. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (stating that “[a]ny party may serve on any other
party a request (1) to produce and permit the party making the request, or someone
acting on the requestor’s behalf, to inspect and copy, any designated documents
(including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, phono-records, and other
data compilations from which information can be obtained, translated, if necessary, by the
respondent through detection devices into reasonably usable form), or to inspect and copy,
test, or sample any tangible things which constitute or contain matters within the
scope of Rule 26(b)”) (emphasis added).
39. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee notes (1970) (noting the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure anticipate technological change and evolve accordingly as a
robust set of procedural rules governing litigation).
40. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b) (indicating, for the purpose of specificity and to avoid
overbreadth, that “[t]he request shall set forth, either by individual item or by
category, the items to be inspected, and describe each with reasonable
particularity”). But see Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical
Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 691 (1998) (moving
away from the belief that an overbroad request is burdensome, so long as there is a
plausible basis to find relevant information and recognizing the liberal nature of
discovery).
41. See Robins, supra note 1, at 421 (noting that historical data and multiple
versions of the same file therein reside below the surface of electronic files,
expanding the universe of discoverable data and increasing data vulnerability).
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42

adjudication, is not being met because of the outrageous costs of
43
electronic discovery retrieval and review. The advisory committee
also recognizes that electronic storage expands the amount of
information available for discovery and notes the potential that the
44
abundance of data will have on increasing litigation costs.
The
complex and laborious process of culling information during
electronic discovery costs time and money, which contradicts the goal
45
of the Federal Rules to ensure efficient and inexpensive discovery.
Due to the inherent differences between electronic documents and
traditional documents, the Honorable Shira A. Scheindlin and Jeffrey
Rabkin recommend changes to the Federal Rules to better address
electronic discovery needs. The recommended changes entail
adding language to Rule 34 that would require data compilations to
be within the “possession, custody, or control” of the producing party
46
in order to avoid unnecessarily costly fishing expeditions for data.
In addition, Scheindlin and Rabkin suggest that courts require cost
shifting for requests of duplicate hard-copy evidence and that the
burden of persuasion should shift to the requesting party in order to
shift costs back to the producing party for duplicate hard-copy
47
evidence. In order to make changes to the rules, the rulemaking
body in charge of the Federal Rules must adhere to a pseudolegislative process that makes amending the Rules more difficult than
48
the general legislative process.
42. See Carol McKay, Delays in Litigation Costly All Around, 48 FED. LAW. 16, 16
(2001) (noting that Congress enacted the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) to “facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases
on the merits, monitor discovery, improve litigation management, and ensure just,
speedy and inexpensive resolution of civil disputes” as required by Rule 1).
43. See Stephen J. Snyder & Abigail E. Crouse, Applying Rule 1 In the Information
Age, 4 SEDONA CONF. J. 165, 165 (2003) (positing that electronic discovery may negate
the underlying goal of fast and inexpensive adjudication).
44. See Advisory Comm. on Rules of Civil Procedure, Judicial Conference of the
United States, Minutes, Apr. 19-20, 1999, 1999 WL 1702844, at *29 (citing Judge
Niemeyer’s statements about how electronic discovery greatly expands costs because
of the increased universe of information available for discovery and that the advisory
committee cannot count itself as free from these discovery issues).
45. Id.
46. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 3, at 374 (arguing that amending Rule
34(a) to require “possession, custody or control” would reduce judicial intervention
during discovery and thus streamline litigation by eliminating mini-trials about
discovery disputes outside the province of the producing party).
47. See id. at 375 (justifying a cost shift back to the requesting party to pay for
duplicate hard copies of electronic evidence by stating each party bears its own costs
for preparation and that making duplicates where the discovering party requests the
same evidence produced both electronically and in hard copy form should be
considered preparation costs).
48. See R. LAWRENCE DESSEM, PRE-TRIAL LITIGATION: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE
206-07 (2d ed. 1996) (explaining the steps for the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the amendment procedure, including submission to the
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In addition to Rule 34, Rule 26 also includes references to
electronically discoverable information. Disclosure requirements in
49
The
Rule 26 include electronically discoverable information.
advisory committee notes make clear that relevant documents and
records might include “computerized data and other electronically50
recorded information.”
However, whether computer-created
information such as temporary files, backup data, cookies, web cache,
51
52
and history files are considered subject to discovery is uncertain.
Furthermore, Rule 26 contains limitations on discovery where
53
there is an undue burden on the producing party. According to the
proportionality test, a method of examining undue burden, where
burden on the producing party outweighs the benefit to the
discovering party, courts have the discretion to shift costs of
Supreme Court and the ability of Congress to create legislation to reject, modify, or
defer the amendment). While there is a general process to follow when suggesting
and implementing a change to the Federal Rules, legislative history such as
committee reports and hearings are not regularly available for amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, RULEMAKING PROCESS,
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE PROCEDURES: PROCEDURES FOR THE CONDUCT OF BUSINESS BY THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEES ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/procedurejc.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2004) (on file
with the American University Law Review) (describing where to find public
information related to promulgation of new rules). The public receives wide
circulation of the proposed rules and may attend public hearings about proposed
rules. Id. In addition, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
maintains records of meetings, reports, and correspondence from the advisory and
standing committees. Id.
49. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B) (requiring a copy or description of all
documents, data compilations, and tangible things during initial disclosure).
50. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee notes (1993).
See also Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 3, at 347 (listing backup files, temporary
files, cached files, cookies, and other information stored in electronic form as sui
generis family of computer-created information).
51. Backup is defined as a copy or multiple copies of computer data on an
external storage medium. HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON’S TELECOM DICTIONARY 89 (15th
ed. 1999). Such media include floppy disks, tapes, and compact discs. Id. at 89, 156,
317. Backups are necessary because computers and networks can be unreliable,
creating the possibility of loss of data. Id. at 89. A cookie is a means by which the
server side of an Internet connection can store and retrieve information from the
client side. Id. at 208. The advantage of cookies is that it allows easier and faster
access to previously visited websites. Id. One disadvantage is that cookies may be
placed on the user’s computer without the user’s knowledge, thereby raising privacy
issues. Id. A cookie file is a file on the user’s hard drive where the cookie is stored.
Id. at 209. Cache, when referring to computer systems or networks, is most simply
defined as information that is stored in anticipation of need, so that it can be
presented more quickly than accessing the hard drive. Id. at 130-31. Web cache is a
place on a user’s computer where graphics and text can be stored to reduce
download time when the user desires to view them during subsequent visits to the
site. Id. at 131, 919.
52. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 3, at 347 (suggesting that the Federal
Rules leave open the question of whether system data generated by a computer
would be considered a discoverable document by itself).
53. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).
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54

production to the discovering party. The Federal Rules allow judges
and advocates to use multiple rules as tools for allocating the costs of
55
discovery. The 1970 advisory committee notes recommend invoking
56
Rule 26(c) in order to limit discovery. However, in practice, courts
also point to and rely on Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) to limit discovery and
shift costs, as Rule 26(b)(2) works in the same way as Rule 26(c) to
57
limit discovery and to shift costs at the court’s discretion.
B. Electronic Discovery is Distinct from Traditional Discovery
The Federal Rules govern electronic discovery in the same manner
58
as traditional discovery of paper files. However, there are profound
costs and burdens, as well as technological differences, associated
59
with electronic discovery. The unyielding costs of retrieving and
reviewing electronic data may increase the burden of discovery, even
60
where data management practices enable access to electronic files.
54. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) (enabling the judge to shield discovery or shift
costs to the requesting party in proportion to the burden imposed when the “burden
or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit”).
55. See Redgrave, supra note 21, at 204 (discussing court intervention techniques
during electronic discovery requests).
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee notes (1970).
57. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(iii). See, e.g., Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders,
437 U.S. 340, 359 (1978) (pointing out that the test should be whether the expense is
substantial rather than whether the burden is undue as under Rule 26(c)); Hickman
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (recognizing that the process of discovery
includes boundaries as part of fundamental fairness).
58. See Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 461 (D. Utah 1985) (stating that
black letter law indicates electronic evidence is discoverable); see also KENNETH J.
WITHERS, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY:
NATIONAL WORKSHOP FOR UNITED STATES
MAGISTRATE
JUDGES
2
(June
12,
2002),
at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ElecDi08.pdf/$file/
ElecDi08.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review) (suggesting that up
to ninety-three percent of generated information is electronic, based on a 2000 ABA
Litigation Section Survey).
59. See Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J.
561, 580-81 (2001) (recognizing that technical differences present practical
difficulties, immense costs, and socioeconomic effects unlike traditional discovery);
Patricia Nieuwenhuizen, E-Mail: The Smoking Gun of the Future as Paper-Based Data Go
by the Wayside, Counsel Must be Prepared to Collect, Produce, and Review Electronic Evidence,
GLASSER LEGALWORKS (2000), WL EDRMS-GLASS-CLE 291, 293 (noting that turning
over electronic data in its native format may not be sufficient for the requesting party
since problems with privileged information may add to the steps necessary for the
requesting party to use the information); Thomas Y. Allman, The Need for Federal
Standards Regarding Electronic Discovery: There are Vast Differences Between Discovery of
Hard-Copy Documents and Those Stored Electronically, and the Difference Should be
Recognized, 68 DEF. COUNS. J. 206, 206 (2001) (proposing that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure change to address the unique discovery needs of electronic files,
including the added costs of search, retrieval, and translation of files into a usable
format).
60. See Patrick J. Burke & Daniel M. Kummer, Controlling Discovery Costs, LEGAL
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2003, at 19-20 (considering the unyielding costs of electronic
discovery in litigation); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. CIV.A.99-
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While it has been suggested that different rules should govern cost
allocation with electronic discovery because of the increased burden
61
to retrieve, sift through, and organize the information, the
traditional rules of discovery still govern, as the rules consider
62
electronic data simply as an evolved version of a paper document.
While the Civil Rules advisory committee discussed the uniqueness
of electronic discovery and referred the matter to the discovery
subcommittee, the treatment of electronic discovery vis-à-vis
63
traditional documents remains the same. In the meantime, courts
continue to struggle with how to deal with the unyielding costs of
64
electronic discovery. Despite the view that electronic information is
simply an evolved version of paper information, there are distinct
differences between traditional and electronic discovery. One of the
main distinctions between electronic discovery and traditional
3564, 2002 WL 246439, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2002) (estimating that to conduct
digital discovery would cost $6.2 million and require six months to retrieve, produce,
and present e-mail stored in backup databases).
61. See Redish, supra note 59, at 561 (espousing the conditional cost shift model
that examined accessibility of data as part of the reasonableness analysis for costshifting).
62. See Bills, 108 F.R.D. at 461; supra note 39 and accompanying text
(maintaining that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to electronic data in the
same way as with paper files, as the rules evolve as technology advances). In the
context of depositions, the Rules evolved to include the telephone as a means of
recording information while conducting depositions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory
committee notes (1980) (authorizing, under Rule 29, the use of a telephone as a
method for recording depositions). Moreover, Rule 29 permits parties to take
depositions in “any manner” so long as stipulated, and parties are encouraged to
agree on the least expensive and least time-consuming methods of obtaining
information. FED. R. CIV. P. 29 advisory committee notes (1993).
63. See Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Judicial Conference of the United States,
Minutes, at 23-28 (Oct. 14-15, 1999), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules
/Minutes/1099mnCV.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review)
(discussing electronic discovery as a topic of interest regarding cost-shifting but
making no changes to the rules specific to electronic data). But see Civil Rules
Advisory Committee, Judicial Conference of the United States, Minutes, at 34-37
(Oct. 3-4, 2002), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CRAC1002.pdf
(on file with the American University Law Review) (hinting that electronic discovery
may warrant amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if issues remain
prevalent and unresolved); Carangelo & Graham, supra note 4, at 37 nn.20-21 (listing
seven aspects to consider related to electronic discovery when the advisory
committee next drafts amendments to the Federal Rules including: wrapping
electronic discovery issues into the Rule 26(f) conference; requiring disclosure of
computer systems; redefining the term “document” as it relates to deleted data and
backup data; specifying the form of production of electronic data such as whether
additional software is needed; exploring the level of effort needed to produce
electronic data; defining privileges as they relate to electronic data; and creating a
safe harbor provision to better guide document retention practices).
64. See Carangelo & Graham, supra note 4, at 37 nn.20-21 (arguing that
amendments should clarify how to deal effectively with the unique issues of
electronic discovery, and until the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure change to
accommodate the complexity of electronic data, courts will continue to wrestle with
how to manage costs).
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discovery of documents is that the costs are typically much greater for
65
electronic data production.
Additionally, there are cost saving methods available for paper
66
documents that are not available for electronic documents.
Notably, in traditional document retrieval, the requesting party may
search for pertinent information after the producing party retrieves
the files rather than require the producing party to find the relevant
67
information. This reduces the burden on the producing party by
reducing the amount of time needed to sift through files by giving
68
the requesting party the option of searching through the paper files.
By contrast, allowing the requesting party to review electronic files
69
freely is not practicable. Unlike information culled from traditional
discovery, data discovered electronically may require additional steps
70
in order to put the information in a usable format. Moreover, the

65. See id. at 35 nn.4-5 (suggesting that because of the large volume of e-mail
generated at different subsidiary locations within a dispersed organization, electronic
discovery imposes more costs than old-fashioned paper documents, particularly when
large corporations are involved); see also Allman, supra note 59, at 206-07 (arguing
that electronic records differ from traditional documents because of the sheer
volume of data, multiple versions of documents, and practical problems associated
with retrieval). But see Carlton S. Chen et al., Managing Discovery in Large-Scale and
Pattern Litigation, ACCA DOCKET, WL 21 NO. 9 ACCADKT 60, 72 (2003) (noting,
during a study comparing the costs for an electronic search with a manual search
done by paralegals who retrieved files through traditional paper-based discovery, that
electronic discovery saves money in searches). However, while the electronic search
cost only four seconds in time compared with sixty-seven hours in time for the
manual search, the electronic search required programmers to code, image, and set
up a database which cost a total of $22,300 versus the manual search that cost $7,370.
Id.
66. See Pulver, supra note 5, at 1386, 1407 (arguing that cost saving techniques
such as handing over files for the requesting party to review are not available in
electronic discovery since electronic discovery demands greater protection of
documents).
67. See id. at 1386 (arguing that the cost-saving option in traditional discovery to
have the requesting party search for pertinent information once records are made
available from the producing party is no longer a viable technique during electronic
discovery, because parties need programming expertise to search through another
party’s database for relevant information).
68. See id. (suggesting time-saving techniques available during traditional
discovery are not available during electronic discovery due to complex electronic
data that often requires expertise outside the scope of opposing counsel).
69. See Robins, supra note 1, at 421 (finding electronic discovery increases the
risk of exposure to privileged or confidential information); see also Rothman v.
Emory Univ., 123 F.3d 446, 455 (7th Cir. 1997) (prohibiting parties from turning
over a mass of documents or deliberately mixing documents during discovery).
70. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 59, at 591 (explaining that preparation of
electronic evidence requires special knowledge of computer technology to obtain
and translate the data into a readable format); Lisa M. Arent et al., EDiscovery:
Preserving, Requesting & Producing Electronic Information, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 131, 134 n.8 (2002) (elaborating on constraints whereby electronic
evidence is only usable on respondent’s devices and data requires special preparation
in order to be read by the requesting party).
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producing party may have to create additional software programs to
access the information, or purchase software licenses for technology
72
Further, the expertise required to navigate
no longer in use.
through the information systems is unlike sifting through paper files
because the search and retrieval may require technical expertise and
understanding of information technology infrastructure and
73
document management policies.
Despite some of the disadvantages of computer-based discovery,
searches from retrieved electronic files may save costs and increase
74
the efficiency of discovery. By understanding how an opponent’s
computer systems work, parties can leverage the technological
75
Computeradvantage of expedited searches through databases.
based discovery may reduce litigation costs and delays by saving
76
time.
Furthermore, electronic discovery may reveal even more
evidence than in traditional discovery, as computers assist litigants in
the collection, manipulation, analysis, and transmission of truths
77
otherwise lost or destroyed.
In addition to requiring additional steps to readily access files and
demanding specialized knowledge of computer systems, electronic
discovery may also increase exposure to confidential and irrelevant
files. Allowing access to a central file room containing business
documents in hard copy form is not the same as enabling the adverse
party to access central servers containing multiple electronic

71. See In re Air Crash Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport, 130 F.R.D. 634, 636
(E.D. Mich. 1989) (noting that extra programming was needed solely for litigation).
72. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 3, at 379 (illustrating that one company
may use a different word processing program than the requesting party, and so the
requesting party would require its own license to view the data generated by the
producing party).
73. See Lesley Friedman Rosenthal, Electronic Discovery Can Unearth Treasure Trove
of Information or Potential Land Mines, 75 N.Y. ST. B.J. 32, 35 (2003) (noting new career
opportunities for digital detective work because of the influx of deeply complex
electronic evidence investigation).
74. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 3, at 364 (noting that there are practical
distinctions between traditional and electronic discovery such as time saved through
expedited searches).
75. See Jay E. Grenig, Electronic Discovery: Making Your Opponent’s Computer a Vital
Part of Your Legal Team, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 293, 324 (1997) (suggesting effective
use of technology by understanding how opponents store and generate computer
based information may afford efficiencies during electronic discovery).
76. See Kenneth J. Withers, Advanced Discovery Issues: Discovery and Protection of
Electronic Data, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, WL SG101 ALI-ABA 835, 849-50 (2002)
(noting time savings during document discovery in electronic form through more
organized searches, the improved ability to add electronic data directly to litigation
support systems, and quick media conversion during electronic courtroom
presentations).
77. Id. at 850.

REPA.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

270

2/1/2005 10:47:18 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:257

78

systems.
For example, the requesting party may not have the
expertise necessary to search through or translate the electronic data,
and the information contained in the electronic database may
contain confidential information related to the opposing counsel’s
79
litigation strategy. Adding to the complexity, additional layers of
information may be available during electronic discovery, including
multiple versions of documents within the same electronic document
80
file.
Further, a lengthy e-mail trail may involve hundreds of
duplicates of the same electronic message sent to multiple recipients
and could be included as files requested and required to be retrieved
81
by the producing party.
Finally, the added cost of productivity loss from computer
downtime during electronic discovery may have an impact on
business processes unlike traditional discovery since retrieving
electronic files may take away from the use of computer systems
82
necessary for employees to do their work. Loss of the computer
system for a significant amount of time may undermine a party’s
83
business and cause substantial disruption. Additionally, employees
78. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 3, at 348 (discussing the impracticability
of providing direct access to computer data since privileged information such as
trade secrets or proprietary data may be accessed during electronic discovery); see also
Redish, supra note 59, at 591 (providing that direct access to data storage facilities is
not a viable option during litigation because of the confidential nature of data
storage locations and content). But see Playboy Enter. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050,
1054 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (finding that electronic files were still discoverable despite the
proprietary nature of data containing embedded confidential information).
79. See Pulver, supra note 5, at 1415-16 (discussing the trepidation involved with
translating computer-stored information into a format considered usable by the
courts since the rules fail to specify what a “usable” form entails); see also Richard L.
Marcus, Confronting the Future: Coping with Discovery of Electronic Material, 64 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 264, 269 (2001) (suggesting that electronic discovery requires
additional experts to analyze and access data not otherwise needed for hard-copy
documents). Accessing electronic data may be more revealing because e-mail
communication often generates unguarded and spontaneous communication. Id.
80. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 3, at 365 (revealing that “invisible”
evidence may be embedded within a computer and not easily retrieved by an average
computer user); see also Kenneth K. Dort & George R. Spatz, Discovery in the Digital
Era: Considerations for Corporate Counsel, 20 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 11, 13 (2003)
(describing layers of electronic documents that include “metadata” such as creation
date or modification date within the electronic file). The “metadata” reveals the
traits of a document and generates history within the document itself and may be
subject to discovery. Id.
81. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 3, at 370 n.167 (noting that “the text of email communications can be forwarded to multiple individuals along with additional
comments” and that “a critical communication may be passed on to many users and
stored on their computer as a data file”).
82. See Robins, supra note 1, at 440 (explaining the process of analyzing a
computer system inevitably requires the use of the physical hard drive for a specific,
but variable amount of time).
83. See Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 1055 (recognizing that turning over a hard drive
to enable the requesting party to discover information relevant to the lawsuit disrupts
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often include personal information on their computer systems, thus
promoting additional resistance by employees against discovering
84
their confidential files. Some employees feel that their individual
privacy rights are infringed during discovery of electronic files stored
85
on their computer systems.
C. Background of Cost-Shifting Jurisprudence
Courts have struggled with how to address cost-shifting disputes
during electronic discovery. What began as a tight reign on costshifting loosened after courts started to understand the complex and
burdensome nature of electronic discovery requests. One court,
however, did not follow this trend and instead restricted cost-shifting
to matters pertaining to inaccessible data rather than basing its
86
decision on the particular facts and circumstances of the case.
In general, there is an overall presumption for the producing party
to bear the burden of costs for all forms of discovery and for the
87
responding party to comply with discovery requests.
Each party
bears its own costs for discovery, barring any legislative limits, undue
88
In some cases, however, the judge
burden, or excessive costs.
managing electronic discovery may limit discovery where the request

business and may reveal confidential information related to the litigation).
84. Id.
85. See Michael Marron, Discoverability of “Deleted” E-mail: Time for a Closer
Examination, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 895, 922 (2002) (discussing privacy concerns of
individual employees as only one aspect of document production and explaining
that in Rowe, the court rejected privacy concerns as a reason to stall or reduce
production of e-mail messages). Since the e-mail messages reside on resources
belonging to the company, the personal nature of electronic files is irrelevant since
the organization for which the employee works owns the electronic information. See
Bonnie C. Glassberg et al., Electronic Communication: An Ounce of Policy is Worth a
Pound of Cure, 39 BUS. HORIZONS 74, 79 (1996) (indicating that electronic mail
belongs to the company and not the employee).
86. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
[hereinafter Zubulake I] (finding that the requesting party, Laura Zubulake, who
sought to retrieve e-mail evidence from backup tapes in a gender discrimination
lawsuit against her former employer, UBS Warburg LLC, may bear some of the costs
of restoring inaccessible data).
87. See S. Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 2 F.3d 1023, 1029-30 (10th Cir.
1993) (discussing the presumption that the producing party must pay for the
expense of discovery requests, but that the court may grant protection against
“undue burden or expense” by shifting costs of discovery to the requesting party as a
condition of discovery).
88. See Redish, supra note 59, at 612 (revealing that express legislative directives
that protect a group of plaintiffs may require cost-shifting); see also Rowe Entm’t, Inc.
v. William Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (elaborating on Rule
26(c) whereby courts may protect parties from undue burden or expense by
exercising discretion). But see Braeutigam, supra note 5, at 173-74 (distinguishing the
American rule, where each party bears the costs of its own litigation, and the English
rule, where the losing party pays for the legal fees of both parties).
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results in an undue burden, produces redundant data, contains
irrelevant information, or infringes on privacy rights by accessing
89
privileged files. Nevertheless, a majority of courts deny requests to
shift costs because the need to obtain the discoverable information
90
outweighs the burden on the producing party.
Initially, the courts did not typically permit cost-shifting during
electronic discovery because the cost of doing business inevitably
involved the production of electronic data as a natural progression of
91
business operations. Courts, reluctant to sympathize with businesses
that failed to take precautions necessary to manage risks, did not
want to force opponents to pay for the faulty business practices and
92
record keeping of the opposing party. Courts often found that the
requesting party should not have to pay for the producing party’s
poor choice of electronic storage and data management devices and
93
techniques. As a result, the party responding to discovery requests
94
often had to bear the costs of electronic discovery. For example, in
95
Daewoo Electronics Co. v. United States, the court considered the
normal and reasonable translation of data into a usable form as part
of an ordinary and foreseeable burden imposed on businesses. Cases
reveal that the effective management of technological resources

89. See Jonathan M. Redgrave, The Sedona Conference Working Group on Electronic
Document Retention and Production, 4 SEDONA CONF. J. 197, 198-99, 223 (2003)
(imposing a “rule of reasonableness” for electronic discovery and suggesting a
common sense approach for counsel to object to unreasonable discovery requests);
see also Kenneth J. Withers, Computer-Based Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation, 2000
FED. CTS. L. REV. 2, III.B.1-III.B.2 (2000) (suggesting the pre-trial conference as an
important judicial management tool for tackling electronic discovery issues).
90. See Corinee L. Giacobbe, Note, Allocating Discovery Costs in the Computer Age:
Deciding Who Should Bear the Costs of Electronically Stored Data, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
257, 267 (2000) (indicating that courts generally disfavor cost-shifting in instances
where the producing party should have electronic data in a usable form as an
ordinary and foreseeable cost of doing business); see also William W. Schwarzer, The
Federal Rules, The Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 703, 703
(1989) (suggesting that the volume and complexity of cases necessitates judicial
control of discovery to manage the scope and pace of litigation).
91. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL
997, 1995 WL 360526, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995) (finding that the parties must
produce backup tapes as a cost of doing business in the digital age).
92. See, e.g., Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73, 76 (D. Mass. 1976)
(finding that costly or time-consuming discovery should not halt production of
documents where the material is relevant and necessary to discovery evidence).
93. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL
997, 1995 WL 360526, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995) (holding the producing party
responsible for retrieving electronically stored data at a cost approximated at $50,000
to $70,000 as an expense of doing business).
94. See Kozlowski, 73 F.R.D. at 76 (requiring discovery even though the retrieval
was unduly and costly).
95. 650 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1986).
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becomes a business imperative in light of judicial allowance of broad
discovery.
Courts later broadened the ability to shift costs back to the
requesting party due to the unyielding costs inherent in electronic
96
discovery retrieval, production, and review.
The court in Rowe
97
Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency quickly set the standard
for cost-shifting during electronic discovery by permitting broader
98
application of the undue burden test. In Rowe, the court granted
the responding party’s motion to compel discovery of back-up tapes
and hard drives at the expense of the requesting party because the
burden of retrieval outweighed the perceived benefit to the
99
requesting party. The estimated cost shifted to the requesting party
100
in Rowe was between $158,000 and $236,000. By allocating costs in
proportion to benefit and need, the cost burden for electronic
discovery shifted to the requesting party when there was an undue
101
burden on the producing party.
Following Rowe, courts favoring cost-shifting often based their
decision on the flexible eight-factor undue burden test announced in
Rowe, which properly allocated the costs of electronic discovery on
102
the benefits and burdens to the parties.
The Rowe test examined
the following eight factors to determine whether to shift costs: the
specificity of the request; the likelihood of discovering crucial
information; the availability of such information from alternative
sources; the purposes for maintaining requested data; the benefit to
both parties; the costs of production; the ability and incentive for

96. See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421, 431-32
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (shifting cost of discovery to requesting party when retrieval and
disclosure of information would otherwise prove too costly).
97. Id. at 421.
98. See Carangelo & Graham, supra note 4, at 35-36 (noting that, prior to
Zubulake, multiple courts turned to the Rowe standard for guidance on the
appropriate allocation of costs during electronic discovery production disputes); see
also Andrew J. Ruzicho & Louis A. Jacobs, Discovery Seeking Inaccessible Material Can
Result in Cost-Shifting, 26 NO. 11 EMPL. PRAC. UPDATE 2, 6 (2003) (discussing the
proportionality test from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Rule 26(b)(2) that
limits discovery in cases where the “burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit”).
99. Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 433.
100. See id. at 431 (indicating that the “magnitude of these expenses favors costshifting”).
101. See id. at 433 (holding that plaintiffs shall bear the costs of production).
102. See, e.g., In re Bristol-Myers Squibb, 205 F.R.D. 437, 443 (D.N.J. 2002)
(following the Rowe cost-shifting approach where requesting party bears costs of
discovery); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., No. CIV.A.99-3564, 2002 WL
246439, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2002) (noting that Rowe “provides sound guidance
for resolution of these issues where the retrieval, production, and review of e-mail
from backup tapes is at issue”).
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each party to control costs; and the financial resources available to
103
both parties. While Rowe permitted producing parties to shift costs
104
to requesting parties for the retrieval of electronic information, the
producing party had to allow the requesting party to either review emails for responsiveness or bear the cost of assembling the files for
105
responsiveness and identifying privileges.
106
However, the recent decision in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg limited
cost-shifting to only extenuating circumstances by requiring the data
to be inaccessible in order to shift the burden of costs to the
requesting party. This shift further increases the burden on the
107
producing party. The new Zubulake test eliminates the “specificity”
and “purposes” factors and replaces the Rowe test with a seven-factor
test organized in order of importance rather than based on flexible
108
factors. The court in Zubulake unveiled the new seven-factor test for
shifting costs during discovery, the factors being: the extent the
request is specifically tailored to discover relevant information; the
availability of information from other sources; the total cost of
production compared to the amount in controversy; the total cost of
production compared to the resources available to each party; the
ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so; the
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and the benefits to
109
the parties of obtaining the information.
The Zubulake decision
includes a three-step cost-shifting analysis that determines the
threshold question of whether the electronic evidence is
110
inaccessible.
If the court considers the data inaccessible, the
producing party may provide sample data to predict the costs of
111
Finally, considering the Zubulake seven-factor
overall production.

103. See Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 2002 WL 246439, at *5 (describing the eight step
Rowe test for determining undue burden by balancing the cost of production against
the need for the information).
104. See id. (applying Rowe test where plaintiff had to bear costs of retrieving emails from backup tapes).
105. Id. at *7.
106. See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D.
at 318 (imposing a threshold test where data
must be in an inaccessible format in order to analyze whether or not production of
documents imposes an undue burden).
107. See id. at 324 (indicating that courts should only consider cost-shifting in
situations where electronic data is relatively inaccessible).
108. See id. at 321 (noting the elimination of the redundant Rowe factor of
“specificity of the discovery request” and the “purposes for which the responding
party maintains the requested data” since the business reason for storing the data
does not impact accessibility).
109. Id. at 322.
110. Id. at 324.
111. Id.
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test, the court weighs the benefit of the data against the burden for
112
retrieving and producing data.
1.

The difference between inaccessible and accessible data
While limiting cost-shifting to situations where data is relatively
inaccessible may provide a bright line rule, whether the data is
indeed inaccessible is not so easily determined and must be
113
In order to determine
considered based on the circumstances.
whether to shift costs under the Zubulake rule, the court must first
114
examine the accessibility of the requested data. Accessible data can
be retrieved with relative ease and resides in a readily identifiable
115
location. By contrast, disaster recovery data on backup servers used
116
for emergency purposes would likely be considered inaccessible.
The justification for treating inaccessible data differently is that the
117
data has to be restored or manipulated in order to be usable.
118
One way to analyze accessibility turns on the method of storage.
In Zubulake, the court listed five categories of data based on storage
method and included backup tapes, erased, fragmented, or damaged
119
data as types of data likely to qualify as inaccessible. New forms of
112. Id.
113. See id. at 323-24 (noting that a quandary exists whereby the courts must
struggle with applying a rule of inaccessibility and a multi-factor test weighed in
descending order). The Zubulake test contains both a rigid rule of accessibility and
flexible standards when dealing with cost-shifting. Id. An analogous approach in
Civil Procedure uses a threshold test in a flexible manner in the context of class
actions to determine whether or not to grant a preliminary injunction motion. See
Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE
L.J. 1251, 1280 (2002) (suggesting that the threshold test performs a gatekeeping
function yet allows for adjustment based on the merits of the case before certifying a
class); see also In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Austria on Nov. 11, 2000, No. MDL No.
1428(SAS), 2004 WL 515534, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2004) (applying a threshold
test in the context of jurisdiction where a litigant must first establish minimum
contacts in order to determine the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction over a
defendant).
114. See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324.
115. See id. at 320 (categorizing data that is easily retrieved and usable without
manipulation as accessible).
116. See id. (noting the more complex process for restoring backup data to a
usable form); see also McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 33 (D.D.C. 2001)
(explaining the random nature in which backup tapes collect and store
information).
117. See Redish, supra note 59, at 584-85 (suggesting that the retrieval of data
unknown to the user, such as temporary files, involves more effort and expense than
searching for active data); see also Dort & Spatz, supra note 80, at 11 (showing that
complex technology systems, including Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), cellular
phones and pagers, and digital cameras, may be electronic devices subject to
discovery and may require further expertise to retrieve data).
118. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 319.
119. See id. at 319-20 (listing five categories of data including: (1) active, online
data; (2) near-line data; (3) offline storage/archives; (4) backup tapes; and (5)
erased, fragmented, or damaged data). As technology changes, it is likely that the
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electronic evidence, however, such as cookies, temporary files,
120
residual data and web caches may qualify as accessible even though
these types of data are not easily found by the computer user and
121
require additional retrieval steps. Notably, instant messaging (IM)
might surpass e-mail as the number one business communication
122
method in electronic form and could become the new treasure
trove containing highly relevant information during discovery. The
impact that IM, as a communication medium, will have on companies
could be substantial, particularly since employees lack awareness that
instant messages remain on corporate systems and may be retrieved
123
at a later date as evidence.
In addition, electronic evidence that must be retrieved and
subsequently translated in order to be utilized may not pass the
124
Zubulake inaccessibility test.
The ability to access data implicitly
includes the ability to use the data. Furthermore, even if data is not
accessible, where the lack of usability was due to inadequate business
practices, the cost of doing business may include translating the data
125
into usable form. The threshold test of inaccessibility may exclude
inaccessible data that should have been accessible under ordinary
business circumstances.

Zubulake rule will correspondingly change to examine retrieval and usability as
categorization tools rather than limiting analysis to a specific storage method. Id.
120. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 3, at 338-41 (positing conflicting types of
technology that may not necessarily fall under the definition of accessible). Data
embedded within temporary files contains crucial information that tracks the history
of the file, and this form of information will likely qualify as highly relevant and
subject to discovery. Id. at 337-38. However, because of the special programming
and skill required to retrieve the information, the courts may consider unique forms
of technology inaccessible. See infra Part I.D; infra note 157 (discussing cases that
allowed cost-shifting where special programming requirements inhibited
production).
121. See Redish, supra note 59, at 584-87 (describing how information
automatically generated by the computer system and embedded within hidden files is
not easily found by the computer user but may provide key facts necessary to win a
case).
122. See Pike & Fischer, Inc., Instant Messages Emerging as Newest Source of E-evidence,
3 DIGITAL DISCOVERY AND E-EVIDENCE 1 (2003), available at http://www.socha
consulting.com/Publications/DDEE%2009.03.pdf (on file with the American
University Law Review) (noting that analysts predict instant messaging will surpass email as the top electronic communication medium in business).
123. See id. at 2 (warning that remarks made while instant messaging become a
part of the “corporate DNA” and can be used as evidence in a lawsuit). Retrieving
the electronic data created from instant messaging could be considered accessible
yet the burden on producing parties to retrieve such files may be a question with
which courts will have to wrestle. Id.
124. See supra Part III.B (suggesting limitations on cost-shifting when discoverable
information relates to the ordinary cost of doing business).
125. See Giacobbe, supra note 90, at 267 (explaining the court’s belief that cost of
translating data into usable form should normally fall upon the requested party).
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2.

Uncertainty when data is not in usable form
While discovering parties may be able to easily retrieve electronic
data in raw form, thus failing to clear the hurdle of the inaccessibility
test from Zubulake, they may be unable to interpret the data due to its
126
unusable format. The extraordinary steps necessary to produce the
data in a format usable by the requesting party may meet the undue
burden test. However, it may not trigger the cost-shifting analysis
under Zubulake, as technically, the producing party is able to retrieve
the data. The producing party may be able to obtain the data but
must take steps such as programming or licensing in order to use the
127
data.
Courts have allowed cost-shifting where the producing party had to
create “special programming” in order to access the information.
The requesting party may bear the burden of paying for “special
expenses” incurred by the responding party such as the creation of
special programming or the licensing of software in order to review
128
129
the data.
In Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., the plaintiff paid
discovery costs to extract data from files. Another example of a
discovery request for information outside of the scope of ordinary
business and not readily usable occurred where the requesting party
130
had to bear costs because the tape did not exist prior to the request.
126. See OpenTV v. Liberate Tech., 219 F.R.D. 474, 477 (N.D. Cal. 2003)
(including the substantial time and expense needed to extract data and create data
in usable form as factors that earmarked the electronic data as inaccessible under the
court’s interpretation of the Zubulake inaccessibility test). But see Kozlowski v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73, 76 (D. Mass. 1976) (noting that Sears was not allowed
to frustrate discovery because of an inadequate filing system despite being costly and
time-consuming).
127. The “get it” versus “use it” distinction may turn on whether companies should
create the document in a usable form as a cost of doing business. See infra Part I.D.1
(examining how courts allocate costs during translation cases when documents are
not available in English). But see IRON MOUNTAIN, THE CIO CHALLENGE: CHANGE
DISRUPTIVE TRENDS INTO BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY 4-5 (2004), available at
http://www.ironmountain.
com/File_Uploads/Resource_Items/USA/598_0_Disruptive_Trends.pdf (on file
with The American University Law Review) [hereinafter CIO CHALLENGE]
(suggesting that when an electronic file resides on a backup tape for disaster
recovery purposes, the business reason for keeping the data pertains to information
technology use, not record retention use, hence requiring the file to be readable falls
outside the scope of the business purpose for the data).
128. See ABA Section of Litigation, Civil Discovery Standards 29(b)(iii), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/ lookup/ElecDi02.pdf/$file/ElecDi02.pdf (Aug.
1999) (on file with the American University Law Review) (suggesting that the
discovering party should pay “special expenses” incurred, such as creating
supplemental software to retrieve the information or acquiring licenses in order to
legally access the information).
129. No. 94 Civ. 2120(LMM)(AJP), 1996 WL 22976, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 1996).
130. See In re Air Crash Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport, 130 F.R.D. 634, 636
(E.D. Mich. 1989) (shifting costs of producing data in a special format for litigation
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The court in In re Air Crash Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport
contemplated whether the producing party should pay to create the
requested data in a specific format even though the procedure
132
required debugging and manually checking input for accuracy.
Since the data requested only fulfilled litigation purposes, the
133
requesting party bore the costs instead of the producing party.
Consequently, if electronic data requires extra steps in order to open
or interpret the information, the data is not usable and courts may
consider the material inaccessible.
3.

Sampling inaccessible data predicts the costs of production
In addition to applying the threshold test of inaccessibility, an
important part of the Zubulake test involves sampling inaccessible
data. After determining whether or not the electronic data requested
falls under the category of “inaccessible,” the next question to
consider involves sampling the inaccessible data in order to
134
determine the cost-benefit of shifting costs. The sampling test from
135
McPeek v. Ashcroft discusses the attempt to balance the opposing
interests of overbroad requests and the need for adherence to the
general purpose of discovery rules, which is to enable broad discovery
136
of information.
McPeek revealed the competing policies of liberal
discovery and the protection against discovery abuse, and the court
created the sampling step for electronic discovery disputes as a way to
137
solve the dilemma.
As a means of predicting costs during electronic discovery disputes,
sampling electronic data benefits both parties by examining scope
138
and ensuring relevancy. If there are multiple tapes to access, based
on the economic analysis of producing the samples versus all of the
139
evidence, the lower cost of production will likely be the test run. To
purposes to the requesting party).
131. Id. at 635.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 636.
134. See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324 (suggesting that parties first sample the
inaccessible data to better predict the overall costs of retrieval).
135. 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001).
136. See id. at 34 (suggesting that the requesting party might, “like the Rolling
Stones . . . hope that if they ask for what they want, they will get what they need”).
137. See id. (hoping that a sample of the requested material may yield relevant
information and further resolve the competing issues).
138. See id. at 35 (ordering a test run of the database to determine cost, time, and
responsiveness of sample e-mails searched and retrieved); see also Carangelo &
Graham, supra note 4, at 36 (discussing the second prong of Zubulake test, the
sampling step, which requires a factual showing that supports cost-shifting to the
requesting party).
139. See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324 (describing the benefit of sampling data in
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make the most out of the sampling step explored in Zubulake, IT
departments may want to estimate costs upfront for sampling of back140
up tapes to determine costs.
In some cases, the court may opt to skip the sampling step because
of the obviousness of the corresponding costs of retrieval. In OpenTV
141
v. Liberate Technologies, the court found that the data requested
conformed to the definition of inaccessible and did not require data
sampling to determine whether or not to shift costs back to the
requesting party. Since the producing party, Liberate Technologies,
provided the amount of time programmers needed to spend
extracting the data to comply with the discovery request, the court
142
had an approximation of the resources needed to extract the data.
The court deemed the electronic data inaccessible, analyzed the
Zubulake factors, and shifted some of the costs based on both the
benefit the data could provide to the requesting party and the
143
corresponding neutral benefit but high cost to the producing party.
Overall, the Zubulake test minimizes the chances for a producing
144
While
party to shift discovery costs back to the requesting party.
some costs shifted to the requesting party in Zubulake, the producing
party, UBS Warburg, ultimately paid for the majority of the discovery
145
costs.
The new Zubulake test leaves open the possibility for a
requesting party to elicit an overly broad request of electronic
order to better predict overall costs of retrieving electronic files).
140. See McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 34 (premiering the testing step for electronic
discovery as a practical option to forecast the burden of retrieval).
141. See 219 F.R.D. 474, 477
(N.D. Cal. 2003) (finding that unduly
burdensome time requirements and the potentially expensive process needed to
make data available in a usable format qualified the discovery request as an
inaccessible format for discovery purposes).
142. See id. (estimating that extracting source code would take between 125 and
150 hours of work to complete the discovery request for OpenTV).
143. See id. at 478-79 (finding that both parties must share equally in the costs of
extracting source code in order to convert it to accessible format given the relative
resources of each party and the corresponding benefits).
144. See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324 (indicating that responding party should pay
for the costs of production for data kept in accessible formats and courts should only
consider cost-shifting in cases where data is relatively inaccessible); see also Zubulake
v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) [hereinafter Zubulake II]
(allowing cost-shifting to requesting party, Laura Zubulake, for twenty-five percent of
costs associated with restoring backup servers but requiring producing party to pay
for the review and production of data once it is accessible).
145. UBS Must Pay 75% Of Cost for E-mails, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2003, at C7. See
generally UBS Warburg Is Ordered To Pay, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2003, at C9 (announcing
the initial outcome of Zubulake I case where court required the producing party to
pay for review and production of e-mail from backup servers); Susanne Craig & Ann
Davis, Judge Orders UBS to Pay to Retrieve E-Mail, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2003, at 10
(highlighting the outcome of Zubulake II case after further analyzing data that
ultimately shifted only twenty-five percent of costs to the requesting party, despite the
inaccessible nature of the data).
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information during discovery, so long as the data is accessible. As a
147
result, cost-shifting occurs only in narrow cases. Courts may require
companies to pay to make data accessible, even though the data does
148
not have to be accessed in the regular course of business.
Therefore, understanding information systems will help companies
149
predict potential exposure to broad requests.
Corporate counsel will need to anticipate litigation costs and
prepare for potentially broad and burdensome electronic discovery
150
151
requests. While judges may intervene to limit discovery abuse, the
rules are discretionary and will not likely shield producing parties
from excessive costs during discovery. In practice, most judges will
152
not halt discovery simply because of a broad discovery request.
If
the request relates to electronic discovery, courts typically require the
153
producing party to produce electronic files in usable form.
D. The Tipping Factor: Cost-Shifting During Electronic Discovery
Courts often grapple with how to weigh factors during pre-trial
discovery and limit costs where document requests cause undue
burden on the producing party. According to a survey conducted for
the Federal Judiciary Center, one of the main problems of electronic
154
discovery pertains to sharing costs for retrieving information. The
146. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324.
147. See Rosenthal, supra note 73, at 37 (noting Zubulake limits cost-shifting to
instances where data is relatively inaccessible and does not apply the undue burden
test where the data format is accessible).
148. See Merrick T. Rossein, Zublake Modification of Rowe: Eliminating Two Factors,
in 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION § 14:29:75 (2004) (noting that
“it is accessibility, which is the core basis for calculating the cost of production, not
whether the data is kept for a business purpose or another purpose”).
149. See Gene Klimov & Samuel H. Soloman, The Art of War, GLASSER LEGALWORKS,
WL EDRMS-GLASS-CLE 62 (2002) (suggesting that companies prepare a working
group designed to understand retention policies, know the risks and scope of the
organization’s information, and implement audits as a way to better prepare for
electronic discovery requests).
150. See Dort & Spatz, supra note 80, at 14-16 (analyzing Zubulake factors and
providing practical tips to corporate counsel for managing risks and costs, such as
sending a notice letter to opposing counsel to preserve potentially relevant data and
creating document retention policies and procedures to ensure better organization
of electronic files). But see UBS Must Pay 75% Of Cost for E-mails, supra note 145
(indicating that a spokesman for UBS stated, “We are pleased the judge has shifted a
portion of the cost of e-mail restoration to the plaintiff. Traditionally the full cost is
placed on the producing party.”).
151. See Wagener, supra note 5, at 1897 (suggesting that the federal rules allow for
cost-shifting of discovery costs for paper files).
152. See id. (arguing that judges are hesitant to deter discovery because of the
difficulty of distinguishing between abusive discovery practices and legitimate
discovery requests that could reveal relevant evidence).
153. See infra Part I.C.2 (discussing the usable format required for electronic files).
154. See MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON ET AL., A Qualitative Study of Issues Raised by the
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issues that give rise to cost-shifting disputes include hiring computer
experts, accessing privileged information, managing the on-site
inspection of computer systems, and facing preservation or spoliation
155
issues.
In the survey, the majority of cases involving electronic
discovery issues included individual plaintiff employment disputes,
156
general commercial litigation, and patent or copyright issues.
These matters may often involve cost-shifting.
1.

Granting cost-shifting for unduly burdensome requests
Cost-shifting requests are not regularly granted, but where
extraordinary steps are necessary to produce documents, the court
may shift costs. During discovery, courts may require parties to share
expert costs and may shift translation expenses to the requesting
157
party.
In electronic discovery, factors that trigger cost-shifting
include overbroad requests, information not likely to be found,
privileged information, requests that require special programming,
or the inability to access the information because it is not available in
158
the form requested.
Discovery of Computer-Based Information in Civil Litigation 2 (Sept. 13, 2002), at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ElecDi10.pdf/$file/ElecDi10.pdf
(on
file with the American University Law Review) (summarizing that three out of five
magistrate judges handled issues about computer-based evidence during discovery
disputes and that the problem of sharing the costs during retrieval of computerized
information was frequently reported as an issue). Moreover, attorneys generally
preferred rule adjustments to resolve electronic discovery issues more than judges,
who thought the Civil Rules had no major effect on how to accommodate electronic
discovery issues. Id. These findings were based on a survey of 110 magistrate judges,
17 attorneys working on ten key cases relevant to computer discovery, and 10
computer experts. Id. at 2, 5, 9.
155. Id. at 2.
156. See id. at 6 (listing breakdown of matters with relevant computer discovery
issues as twenty-six percent employment, twenty-three percent general commercial
litigation, and eighteen percent patent or copyright issues).
157. See Robins, supra note 1, at 475 (noting the requesting party usually must pay
a fair portion of fees and expenses for retrieving computer-related information from
a producing party’s expert); see also Pearl Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 415
F. Supp. 1122, 1136, 1141 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (requiring that the requesting party bear
costs for the producing party to retrieve documentation pertaining to a computer
program used by the producing party’s expert witness and to pay for a computer
expert to analyze the computer program). Converting a foreign language document
into a usable form may take additional steps for the requesting party to read the
documents. Compare Stapleton v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 69 F.R.D. 489, 490
(N.D. Ga. 1975) (requiring producing party to pay for English translation of
documents because it was a reasonable cost of doing business in the United States),
with Daewoo Elec. Co. v. United States, 650 F. Supp. 1003, 1006 (Ct. Int’l Trade
1986) (finding that normal and reasonable translation of data into usable form was
an ordinary and foreseeable burden).
158. See, e.g., Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 530-32 (1st Cir. 1996)
(holding that a failure to explain the basis for a belief that the materials would be
relevant meant extensive electronic discovery of hard drive to find whether memo
had been modified would be “extremely cumbersome and expensive”); Van
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Another approach to allocating the burden of costs during
159
electronic discovery is to allow cost-sharing rather than cost-shifting.
Notably, even where the court shifts costs to the requesting party for
particular requests, overall, both parties will share the discovery
160
161
costs. In Williams v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., the requesting
party paid the costs for special programming to encode and to
duplicate data while the producing party paid costs to search and
162
produce requested documents.
Similarly, in National Union Electric
163
Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., the court required a party
who requested both hard copy and electronic versions of data to pay
the extra costs of duplication, as the burden of producing the
164
documents was disproportional to the benefit of multiple copies.
Cost-sharing offers an attractive alternative in cases involving complex
discovery costs since it distributes the burden among the parties.
2.

Denying cost-shifting in favor of broad discovery
Not surprisingly, the majority of requests related to cost-shifting in
165
discovery are denied. Judges have extraordinary caseloads and lack
Westrienen v. Americontinental Collection Corp., 189 F.R.D. 440, 441 (D. Or. 1999)
(disallowing overbroad access and requiring discovering party to specify what it is
seeking); Stalling-Daniel v. Northern Trust Co., 52 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1406, 1408 (N.D.
Ill. 2002) (holding that speculations alone are not enough to impose discovery costs
on the producing party); In re Air Crash Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport, 130
F.R.D. 634, 636 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (requiring the requesting party bear costs because
the tape did not exist prior to the request). Compare In re P. R. Elec. Power Auth.,
687 F.2d 501, 506 (5th Cir. 1982) (refusing to require producing party to pay costs of
translating from Spanish to English for the requesting party), with Anti-Monopoly,
Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 2120(LMM)(AJP), 1996 WL 22976, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 23, 1996) (requiring cost-shifting where producing party had to create “special
programming” in order to access information). The court gave the plaintiff the
option of paying extraction costs if it required data in electronic format. Id.
159. See, e.g., Sattar v. Motorola, Inc., 138 F.3d 1164, 1171 (7th Cir. 1998)
(permitting cost-splitting for paper printouts even though information was also
available on readable format disk); In re Two Appeals Arising Out Of San Juan
Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 994 F.2d 956, 967 (1st Cir. 1993) (ordering costsharing and indicating that “[r]eallocating cost-sharing assessments affords a way of
balancing case-specific inequities”).
160. See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal
Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 457-59 (1994) (supporting the idea of a cost-sharing
method for discovery requests, allowing the producing party to shift some of the
costs back to the discovering party rather than pay for the entire discovery request).
161. 119 F.R.D. 648 (W.D.K.Y. 1987).
162. See id. at 651 (ordering parties to share costs because of the undue hardship
imposed in terms of time and expense in order to encode manually the massive
documentation necessary to analyze the raw data and expert reports).
163. 494 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
164. See id. at 1262 (requiring production of hard copy and electronic version of
data but shifting costs to the discovering party to pay for the creation of duplicate
tapes).
165. See Giacobbe, supra note 90, at 267 (noting that the majority of courts require
the producing party to bear all costs of production of electronic discovery requests).
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the time necessary to deal with routine discovery disputes.
As a
result, generalized searches are often allowed and broad requests to
167
In addition, courts are
compel all electronic files are granted.
hesitant to shift costs to the requesting party where the producing
party uses discovery costs as a shield to avoid upgrading computer
168
systems.
Even cost-shifting requests by representative plaintiffs
require parties deriving the benefit to generally bear the cost of
169
compiling information.
Given the low chance of successfully shifting costs during electronic
discovery, the pre-trial conference that requires a discussion of
discovery strategies by both parties may be an important way—
170
perhaps the only way—to limit burden. By bringing discovery issues
to the attention of both parties earlier, there may be increased
incentives to settle fruitless disputes in which it would otherwise prove
171
too burdensome for parties to comply with discovery requests.

Moreover, establishing a professional relationship with the court requires effort to
avoid discovery battles. See Jack J. Goldwood, Professional Conduct: Building Credibility
with the Court, FOR THE DEFENSE, Jan. 2004, at 14 (suggesting lawyers avoid taking up
discovery issues with the court since the court should not play the role of “babysitter”
during pre-trial litigation).
166. See Richard Corbett & Virginia R. Llewellyn, The Next Discovery Frontier, 21
ACCA DOCKET 116, 128 (2003) (noting that judges have little patience for costshifting disputes because of their enormous workload, including 250,000 civil cases
often pending at one time in the federal court system).
167. See Kleiner v. Burns, 48 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 644, 649 (D. Kan. 2000) (including
voice mail messages and files, back-up voice mail files, e-mail messages and files,
backup e-mail files, deleted e-mails, data files, program files, backup and archival
tapes, temporary files, system history files, web site information stored in textual,
graphical or audio format, web site log files, cache files, cookies, and other
electronically-recorded information, despite the failure to particularize the nature
and location of the electronic data).
168. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, MDL
997, 1995 WL 360526, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995) (finding that plaintiff should
not have to pay for defendant’s choice of electronic storage and management).
169. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 359 (1978) (drawing
an analogy to cost-shifting requests during discovery and finding that the defendant
in a class action lawsuit should not bear the expense of compiling a class member list
and that the cost must be borne by the plaintiff).
170. See David H. Schultz & J. Robert Keena, Discovery Challenges in the Electronic
Age, 24 PA. LAW 24, 25-26 (2002) (discussing the importance of the pre-trial
conference to gauge costs anticipated during discovery under Rule 26(f) insofar as
the conference purports to resolve conflicts related to discovery, such as complex
requests to conduct electronic discovery).
171. Bruce Rubenstein, Electronic Discovery Costs Are Leveraging Settlements, CORP.
LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 1997, at 26. But see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW § 21.5 (6th ed. 2003) (explaining the more predictable an outcome, the more
likely parties will facilitate settlement, but the failure to volunteer information may
induce a higher settlement).
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II. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE UNDUE BURDEN TEST VERSUS THE
INACCESSIBILITY REQUIREMENT
The Zubulake decision may signal a movement in the direction of
judicial efficiency since it creates a bright line test to follow regarding
cost-shifting in electronic discovery, even though it is not binding on
172
the federal courts.
Unfortunately, a side effect of the new
inaccessibility test is the possibility of reduced chances for producing
parties to allocate costs to the requesting party where a
disproportionately broad request would otherwise cause undue
173
burden.
Looking beyond the format of information requested, the Federal
Rules examine whether the producing party would experience
disproportionate burden compared to the benefit received by the
174
requesting party.
During traditional discovery, common factors of
undue burden often trigger shifting costs to the requesting party.
Analogous requests during traditional discovery considered unduly
burdensome include such factors as the number of documents,
sensitivity of the information embedded within the documents,
relevance of the information, more convenient alternative locations
of information, and technical complexity of the documents
175
requested.
172. See In re Baker, 264 B.R. 759, 763 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001) (reciting that
according to the doctrine of stare decisis, one court’s decision does not bind another
unless the latter is an inferior court); see also Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Int’l Bhd.
of Elec. Workers Local 15, 961 F. Supp. 1154, 1166 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (discussing
how a decision from one court does not bind other courts of appeals or other district
courts yet may persuade a court’s legal analysis and provide guidance during
interpretation of similar issues). But see POSNER, supra note 171, at § 20.4 (noting that
“stare decisis is less rigidly adhered to the more rapidly the society is changing”).
While greater predictability may speed up judicial decisions, unpredictable
externalities such as technology change may in fact hinder judicial decision-making.
Id.
173. See Rosenthal, supra note 73, at 36-37 (noting that the court will only
entertain cost-shifting in disputes where the data is relatively inaccessible and thus
results in a corresponding challenge to corporate counsel to examine existing
document retention policies in light of the new development in Zubulake).
174. See Ruzicho & Jacobs, supra note 98, at 6 (describing the proportionality test
according to Rule 26(b) that enables courts to halt discovery or impose costs on the
requesting party where undue burden exists).
175. See, e.g., Coker v. Duke & Co., 177 F.R.D. 682, 685-86 (M.D. Ala. 1998)
(finding that burden of production outweighed production costs for a document
request of all information and all documents related to anyone ever discharged from
defendant company, as the broad request for sensitive information showed little
relevance); United States v. Upton, No. Civ. 3:92-CV-00524(AWT), 1995 WL 264247,
at *3 (D. Conn. Jan. 26, 1995) (finding that a request for information already
furnished posed an undue burden); Zonaras ex rel. Zonaras v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
No. C-3-94-161, 1996 WL 1671236, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 17, 1996) (considering the
technical complexity of litigation, relevance of issues, defendant’s financial ability to
pay for the document production, and public policy implications when examining
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By contrast, the inaccessibility test explained in Zubulake ignores
undue burden and allocates costs where the state of the information
is relatively inaccessible rather than according to a cost-benefit
176
analysis. While Zubulake considers undue burden on the producing
party when allocating discovery costs, the request must first fall into
177
the category of inaccessible data. The undue burden test allows for
flexibility and considers electronic discovery on a case-by-case basis,
whereas the inaccessibility test shifts costs in narrow cases where
electronically discoverable information resides in a format or location
178
that is not accessible.
A. The Undue Burden Test
179

The “undue burden” test espoused in Rowe is a flexible standard
that looks at the individual facts of each case without adhering to a
limiting rule of accessibility. The test balances the benefit of the
electronic discovery request against the impact on the producing
party and expands proportionality analysis within the Federal Rules
180
of Civil Procedure in Rule 26. The courts have shifted the cost of
electronic discovery back to the requesting party where undue
181
burden or excessive expenses exist.
The advantage of having a flexible standard, such as the Rowe test,
is that it enables the law to conform to the equities of each individual
182
case.
Rather than limiting cost-shifting based on the state of the
whether or not expense of proposed discovery outweighed the benefits of
production); Mobley v. Edison Chouest Offshore, Inc., No. Civ. A. 95-3120, 1996 WL
363496, at *1 (E.D. La. June 27, 1996) (indicating that the availability of a less
burdensome and more convenient source of information squares with the
requirements of Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) and precludes redundant discovery).
176. See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 319-20 (deciding cost-shifting based on the type
of electronic information requested and the ability to retrieve the electronic file
rather than on a balancing test of multiple factors).
177. See id. at 324 (investigating undue burden only where data first falls into
inaccessible category).
178. See infra Part II.B (suggesting the new Zubulake test narrows cost-shifting).
179. Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
180. See Ruzicho & Jacobs, supra note 98, at 2 (comparing the proportionality test,
a common sense way of determining whether costs and time needed to comply with
discovery request are disproportionate to the value of the material, with Rowe factors,
which further guide courts regarding how to weigh the impact of discovery requests).
181. Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 433.
182. See Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation, Democratic Legitimacy and
Legal-System Values, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 233, 255 (1997) (noting that the law
adjusts to societal changes and achieves fair results, yet remains rigid enough to
maintain stability, predictability, and uniformity); see also John Hasnas, The Myth of the
Rule of Law, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 199, 213 (1995) (positing that “the more definite and
rigidly-determined the rules of law become, the less the legal system is able to do
justice to the individual” and that “if the law were fully determinate, it would have no
ability to consider the equities of the particular case”).
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electronic information, a flexible standard examines factors such as
bargaining power, benefit of the requested materials to the
discovering party, and the purpose of the information in light of the
issues in the case.
The undue burden test employs cost-benefit analysis by examining
183
Since the judicial role of
the total circumstances of each case.
managing discovery in the federal system is subject to increased
184
scrutiny because of the excessive costs of litigation,
a more
economically efficient approach to managing discovery shifts costs
185
based on the bargaining power of each party.
In other words,
producing parties would share discovery costs based on the ability to
186
pay, not on a limiting rule that based cost-shifting on the state of
data. The value of the discoverable information will determine
whether or not the discovering party is willing to pay to retrieve
187
evidence.
The disadvantage to having a flexible standard like the undue
burden test is that it is expensive to enforce, especially in highfrequency cases such as electronic discovery disputes. By contrast, a
188
bright line rule costs less to administer. Even though rules may be
183. See Redgrave, supra note 21, at 198 (analyzing costs, needs, and benefits of
producing electronic evidence through the Sedona principles, a set of best practices
conjured up by The Sedona Conference Working Group, a think tank for electronic
document production). The requesting party’s inquiry should consider whether the
data is redundant, irrelevant, or subject to preservation as part of the cost-benefit
analysis discussed in the Sedona Principles. See id. at 209-11 (considering
reasonableness of electronic document production by examining document
retention procedures, preservation strategy, type of storage systems, and ability to
access files weighed against the benefit and potential for discoverable information
within electronic data).
184. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089
(1990) (implementing legislation to reduce civil litigation costs and delays in federal
courts); Press Release, Brookings Institution, Brookings Task Force Urges Continued
Attention
to
Civil
Justice
Reform
(Mar.
20,
1997),
at
http://www.brook.edu/comm/news/19970320civil.htm (on file with the American
University Law Review) (finding that active judicial management, where
implemented, can reduce congestion in the civil justice system). As a way to reduce
costs and management, early case management and discovery planning will alleviate
strain in the judiciary. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND, DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT:
FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT EVALUATION DATA 40 (1998), at
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR941 (on file with the American
University Law Review) (estimating that mandatory discovery management planning
reduced time until disposition by an average of 104 days).
185. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 160, at 445 (analyzing the discovery
process as contributing to the probability of dispute resolution because it reveals bias
and potential bargaining power).
186. See id. at 456 (suggesting a balanced approach to discovery to ensure
symmetry in transaction costs by requiring each party to bear its own costs until the
“switching point” where the value becomes greater to the requesting party and
therefore shifts the remaining cost of discovery to the adversary).
187. Id.
188. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
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more costly to promulgate than standards due to the added costs of
designing and implementing the rules, the application of rules
189
reveals the cost savings.
Moreover, managerial judging during discovery may also have
disadvantages by reducing litigation efficiency by adding complexity
to the pretrial proceedings, and by contributing to a backlog of cases,
or worse, by threatening impartiality in order to save judicial
190
resources. In fact, some studies suggest that discovery abuse is the
191
Electronic discovery disputes
major cause of delay in litigation.
amongst parties frequently occur, yet cost-shifting occurs in lower
frequency due to the judicial preference against quibbling over the
192
minutiae of discovery costs.
B. The Inaccessibility Test
A rigid rule, such as the inaccessibility test in Zubulake, requires less
judicial involvement and will encourage greater administrative
193
efficiency. The inaccessibility test requires the court to analyze the
type of electronic data requested and whether the process needed to
194
access the data requires an “extraordinary step” in order to
complete the discovery request. A bright line rule based on
accessibility may result in fewer discovery disputes and cost less
557 (1992) (suggesting that the application of rules is less expensive than standards
because of the ability to reflect on the content of previously promulgated rules rather
than having to determine application after the conduct occurs).
189. Id. at 562-63. Further, where conduct is frequent, the savings realized in rule
application will likely exceed the initial costs incurred during rule creation. Id. at
621.
190. See Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative
Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808,
1832-36 (1986) (discussing the shortcomings of managerial judging and its failure to
solve discovery abuse problems). More aggressive participation in settlement
discussions may encourage settlement and deny parties the full opportunity to be
heard. Id. See also Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 661, 663 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)
(expanding the judicial role in order to supervise and limit discovery during a
lengthy, complex case so that the system could protect parties from excessive
expenses, particularly where there is a possibility of abuse).
191. See Louis Harris & Assocs., Inc., Judges’ Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey
of State and Federal Trial Judges Who Spent at Least Half of Their Time on General Civil
Cases, 69 B.U. L. REV. 731, 735 (1989) (listing abuse of discovery and an insufficient
amount of judges for caseload as the top two reasons for litigation delays).
192. See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text (noting the types of requests
where courts have failed to award cost-shifting).
193. See WOLF HEYDEBRAND & CARROLL SERON, RATIONALIZING JUSTICE: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 185 (1990) (examining the tension
between adjudication and administration because caseload management increasingly
pressures courts to find ways to minimize decision times).
194. See Zubulake II, 216 F.R.D. at 290 (explaining that an “extraordinary step”
such as the cost of restoration and search may be subject to cost-shifting in order to
make inaccessible materials accessible (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4)).
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195

overall to adjudicate. However, if a trial judge lacks the familiarity
with computers and fails to understand the complexities of
technology, it may be difficult to determine whether the electronic
196
information is accessible or not.
In addition, a rigid rule fails to consider the totality of the
197
circumstances and may provide more incentive for discovery abuse.
While the Federal Rules may limit unduly burdensome or expensive
discovery, Zubulake narrows the burden analysis to cases where data is
198
inaccessible.
Hence, requesting parties have free reign to cast a
199
wide net during discovery requests.
Even though a clear test for cost-shifting may increase judicial
efficiency, it does so at the expense of justice and may encourage
200
requests without boundaries, which could stifle business.
Indeed,
195. See Stephen D. Easton & Franklin D. Romines II, Dealing with Draft Dodgers:
Automatic Production of Expert Witness Reports, 22 REV. LITIG. 355, 386 (2003) (noting
that a clear and straightforward guideline under Rule 26 in the context of the work
product doctrine avoids future battles regarding discovery and ultimately reduces
discovery costs).
196. See John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery’s Fatal Flaw, 84 MINN. L. REV.
505, 566 (2000) (suggesting that many courts treat discovery problems leniently since
judges in district courts generally spend only five percent of their time on discovery
matters). Moreover, the lack of technical prowess in the judiciary may pose
problems because it could unfairly provide an advantage to parties who misbehave,
as judges devote minimal time to discovery issues. Id. at 567. See also Withers, supra
note 58, at 2 (revealing that discovery management may include up to 93 percent of
electronic discovery suggesting the proliferation of technology and the
corresponding impact on the judicial branch). Furthermore, a survey conducted on
behalf of the Federal Judicial Center determined that education and training of the
judiciary regarding electronic discovery concerns is warranted. See JOHNSON ET AL.,
supra note 154 (describing the perceived need for further education of the judiciary
regarding electronic discovery issues). But see James Boyle, The Anatomy of a Torts
Class, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1003, 1055-60 (1985) (canvassing arguments for bright line
rules and supporting the institutional competency philosophy because courts are
uniquely able to resolve complex matters, respond to changing circumstances, and
maintain objectivity during litigation).
197. See McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001) (arguing that
requiring restoration of backup tapes creates a settlement weapon to use against the
producing party). For practical purposes, a corporate president would prefer to
settle a lawsuit for $100,000 rather than bear the costs of $300,000 for restoring
backup tapes. Id.
198. See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318 (suggesting that courts shift costs to the
requesting party only in cases where the electronic data is relatively inaccessible, such
as with backup data).
199. See infra Part III (discussing how casting a wide net increases the chances of
abuse in the discovery process).
200. See Debra Rosenberg, Hard Pill to Swallow, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15, 2003, at 46
(indicating that the threat of litigation “hangs over every move” of professionals); see
also Stuart Taylor Jr. & Evan Thomas, Civil Wars, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15, 2003, at 45
(showing that society ultimately pays for litigation and that it paralyzes professionals
and hinders competition because of the high costs). Indeed, to avoid litigation and
excessive jury awards, corporations often settle. See Rubenstein, supra note 171, at 26
(discussing incentives to settle cases rather than face the boundless costs of
litigation).
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discovery comes at a great expense for both plaintiffs and defendants;
the expense may be even more burdensome for the plaintiff who may
201
However, courts also
not be able to afford the cost of litigation.
need to recognize that judicial efficiency is not the sole criterion and
that other costs may outweigh a bright-line rule. Limiting the
opportunities to shift costs to the requesting party may improve the
bargaining power of plaintiffs and result in unreasonably high
202
litigation costs that undermine judicial efficiency in the long run.
The Northern District of California has applied the Zubulake factors
in a dispute between two corporations but fine-tuned its definition of
203
inaccessible data.
The tipping factor in OpenTV v. Liberate
204
Technologies hinged on undue burden. In an effort to allocate costs
proportionally, the court rejected a formalistic view of the
inaccessibility test and applied the Zubulake test based on the totality
205
of the circumstances.
According to the court, the extraordinary
steps necessary to retrieve electronic data requested rendered the
request inaccessible, despite the fact that the definition of
206
inaccessible from Zubulake only discussed forms of storage, not
207
retrieval of information.
201. See Brad M. Friedman, Mass Products Liability Litigation: A Proposal for
Dissemination of Discovered Material Covered by a Protective Order, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1137,
1140 (1985) (revealing the constraints on plaintiffs whose legal rights may be stifled
because of the high cost of funding a lawsuit due to high discovery expenses); see also
Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97-100 (1974) (explaining the concept of one-shotters,
parties who only occasionally utilize courts, and repeat players, parties who often
engage in litigation over time, and the correspondingly higher costs and risks for the
one-shotters). But see Taylor & Thomas, supra note 198, at 48 (providing a synopsis of
sympathetic juries that have awarded plaintiffs up to $28 billion for punitive damages
against corporations).
202. See infra Part III.C and accompanying text (discussing how economic leverage
forces unreasonable settlement); see also Taylor & Thomas, supra note 198, at 48
(explaining how “plaintiff-friendly” juries have the effect of increasing the number of
lawsuits instigated by individuals which ultimately undermines judicial efficiency by
clogging the courts).
203. See OpenTV v. Liberate Tech., 219 F.R.D. 474, 478 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (finding
that electronic data stored in a manner difficult to produce in usable form passes the
hurdle of Zubulake’s inaccessibility test and results in cost-sharing for the search and
restoration of electronic source code).
204. Id.
205. See id. at 479 (warranting cost-shifting because the burden of extraction and
copying the data is high and both parties are similarly situated, even though four of
the seven factors weighed against cost-shifting during the dispute between two
corporate parties).
206. Compare Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 319 (including backup servers used for
emergency purposes in its definition of inaccessible and considering the type of
storage device to determine accessibility), with OpenTV, 219 F.R.D. at 478 (examining
the method of extraction and the total burden on the producing party in order to
determine accessibility, noting that the producing party needed to take extra steps to
obtain electronic data and hence qualified as inaccessible).
207. See OpenTV, 219 F.R.D. at 477 (drawing similarities amongst backup tapes and
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The court framed inaccessibility according to whether the data
retrieval required excessive time and expense in order to produce the
208
Surprisingly, the
requested files, constituting an undue burden.
cost of searching for data was included in the definition of
“inaccessible” and the electronic discovery request was considered
209
unduly burdensome. Consequently, the OpenTV application of the
inaccessibility test analyzed whether retrieving data presented an
undue burden in order to determine accessibility.
III. THE NEW RULE FROM ZUBULAKE CREATES INCENTIVES FOR ABUSE
The primary concern with the new inaccessibility test from Zubulake
is that it limits a court’s ability to allocate costs and may result in an
increase of speculative discovery requests that yield non-responsive
210
information.
Prior to Zubulake, a discovery request that failed to
particularize a basis for discovery was “extremely cumbersome and
211
expensive” and thus an undue burden. For example, the failure to
specify the type of memorandum or explain the basis for the belief
that materials would be relevant would not raise a trial-worthy issue or
justify permitting electronic discovery of a hard drive to find out
212
whether a document was modified.
However, Zubulake eliminates
the factor examining the purpose in which the responding party
213
keeps the data and determines undue burden only after passing the
214
threshold test of inaccessibility. Requesting parties correspondingly
215
have broad discretion in fashioning document requests.

the process of extracting source code where the ordinary organization of the
electronic information in both cases results in difficult retrieval).
208. See id. (noting that 125-150 hours of work to extract source code requested by
plaintiff, OpenTV, qualified as inaccessible, as the time was “unduly burdensome and
potentially expensive”).
209. See id. at 479 (finding the expense involved in extracting and copying the
source code warranted some cost-shifting).
210. See Wagener, supra note 5, at 1897 (discussing the reluctance to shift costs
due to the unfair and wasteful nature of fishing expeditions).
211. See Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 531-33 (1st Cir. 1996)
(requiring that discovery expose a potential trial-worthy issue and affirming district
court’s holding that Fennell insufficiently described her reason for accessing First
Step’s hard drive as resulting in substantial costs and risks).
212. See id. at 533 (failing to show evidence of discoverable fabrication of
“autodating” information embedded in material requested for production).
213. See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 321 (reasoning that the purpose for which a party
keeps data is not relevant to the data’s accessibility).
214. See id. (discussing how accessibility guides the determination of undue
burden).
215. See Rosenthal, supra note 73, at 37 (noting the limitations on cost-shifting
correspondingly increases the breadth of information requests).
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A. Bright Line Rule Considers Legitimacy of Discovery Requests
in Narrow Cases
Prior to the bright line rule from Zubulake, courts analyzed the
distinct facts of the case to allocate costs during electronic discovery
216
disputes.
By conducting a cost-benefit analysis, courts allocated
217
costs in proportion to the utility of the information requested. In
218
McPeek v. Ashcroft, the court held that usefulness of the information
219
Similarly, the court in
requested should justify the cost incurred.
220
Byers v. Illinois State Police looked at usefulness, as defined by
relevance, and determined that a motion to compel would be
granted in cases where the electronic information is related to an
221
issue on trial. In each case, and particularly emphasized in Stallings222
Daniel v. Northern Trust Co., speculation alone is not enough to
compel discovery, otherwise it would be an undue burden without
223
justifiable benefit.
However, because data was accessible in these
aforementioned cases, these overbroad requests might be permitted
224
under the Zubulake rationale despite the undue burden.
B. Triggering Change: Creating Local Rule Alternatives
and Modifying Business Behavior
Zubulake may increase incentives to make data inaccessible and may
alternatively undermine judicial efficiency through increased
litigation because of the power advantage given to requesting parties.
216. See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 428-32
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (examining the factual circumstances based on flexible factors).
217. See Ruzicho & Jacobs, supra note 98, at 2 (describing how to determine
whether discovery disproportionately burdens the producing party compared to the
value of the requested material).
218. 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001).
219. See id. at 34 (applying the economic principle of “marginal utility” to
discovery costs in that the greater likelihood that a backup tape contains relevant
information, the greater justification to shift costs to the requesting party).
220. No. 99 C8105, 2002 WL 1264004, at *14 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2002).
221. See id. at *14 (granting motion to compel evidence for requested documents
likely to be responsive).
222. No. 01 C2290, 2002 WL 385566, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2002).
223. See id. at *1 (holding that mere conjecture that data relates to an issue at trial
is not enough to compel discovery of electronic data); McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 34
(noting that a “likelihood of finding something” does not outweigh the risk of a
costly search).
224. See Stallings-Daniel, 2003 WL 385566, at *1 (ruling that the plaintiff failed to
show a compelling need to justify the cost of production of e-mail chains and other
historical information embedded within documents that might have revealed prediscovery tampering); McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 32 (disallowing broad discovery under an
undue burden test where the type of data requested included backup tapes of e-mails
deleted by the user); Byers, 2002 WL 1264004, at *11 (requesting data from old emails generated from an e-mail program no longer in use at the company
disproportionately burdened producing party).
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Consequently, a potential trend might arise in state courts that would
shift costs back to the requesting party for electronic information not
kept in the usual course of business and could inspire a change in the
225
rules. Changes in local rules of practice and procedure often give
rise to amendments to the Federal Rules, as state courts serve as a
226
proving ground for judicial change.
227
If the Zubulake rule becomes the norm and requires data to be
inaccessible before the court will consider shifting costs to the
requesting party during electronic discovery, this may create
228
incentives to make data more inaccessible because the clear rule
hinges on accessibility. Corporate leaders may point to the excessive
costs of retrieving emergency data from some far-off data center with
229
backup servers in India as an excuse for delay and as an unfounded
230
justification for cost-shifting. Even if regulations require document
231
retention policies that store electronic documents longer, the
232
regulations apply to records, not all forms of data.
This may
225. See THOMAS Y. ALLMAN, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS GENERAL
COUNSEL COMMITTEE, A PROPOSED MODEL FOR STATE RULES RE: ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
n.2, at http://www.kenwithers.com/articles/rules_debate/model_state_rule.html
(Nov. 15, 2001) (on file with The American University Law Review) (suggesting that
states such as Texas have appropriately addressed the unique concerns of electronic
discovery costs by shifting costs for requests outside the scope of ordinary business).
226. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (noting “one of the happy incidents of the federal system [is] that a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory . . .”).
227. Searching for clarity on how to deal with electronic discovery disputes, several
district courts adopted the Zubulake approach when analyzing whether or not to shift
costs to the requesting party. See, e.g., Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc., 218 F.R.D. 416, 422
(D. Del. 2003) (citing Zubulake factors to determine whether to shift burden of
production costs during electronic discovery); Thompson v. United States Dep’t of
Hous. and Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 98 (D. Md. 2003) (applying Zubulake test to
determine whether to categorize data as inaccessible and subsequently analyze
burden).
228. See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
229. See Stephanie Overby, Inside Outsourcing in India, CIO MAG., June 1, 2003, at
http://www.cio.com/archive/060103/outsourcing.html (on file with the American
University Law Review) (estimating from 1/2 to 2/3 of Fortune 500 companies
outsource technical support to India, demonstrating global reach of electronically
stored information).
230. See Rosenthal, supra note 73, at 37 (suggesting that because corporations may
strategically restrict “accessibility” to effectively shift costs to the plaintiff, attorneys
should study the Zubulake decisions in order to assess the risk of cost-shifting); see also
STEPHEN L. CARTER, INTEGRITY 4 (1996) (preaching that immorality in the market
may be due to the American desire to win rather than to play by the rules).
231. Cf. Final Rule: Retention of Records Relevant to Audits and Reviews,
Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (2003) (citing the
requirement that accounting firms retain materials from audits of client financial
statements for seven years as an example of record retention regulations).
232. See Peter Sloan, Retention, Preservation, and Spoliation of Electronic Data, GLASSER
LEGALWORKS, WL EDRMS-GLASS-CLE 24, 25 (2002) (explaining that electronic data
retention may not require retaining all data unless necessary for legal or business
purposes).

REPA.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

2004]

2/1/2005 10:47:18 AM

ADJUDICATING BEYOND ORDINARY BUSINESS

293

encourage prompt removal of outdated files as long as files are not
233
deleted out of bad faith or for purposes of litigation. However, the
mere existence of an incentive to purposefully make data inaccessible
does not guarantee that the court will shift costs to the opposing side,
as the benefit to the discovering party may nonetheless outweigh any
234
perceived burden of retrieval.
In the interest of efficiency and in response to common discovery
issues, some states have created local rules to address cost-shifting
during electronic discovery and require that parties discuss electronic
discovery problems during the pre-trial conference as set forth in
235
local rules. The Federal Rules do not specify that litigants need to
236
include electronic discovery issues in the Rule 26(f) conference.
In addition, some state rules may make cost-shifting mandatory for
237
accessing data outside the course of ordinary business.
For
example, in Texas, there is an express provision governing electronic
discovery that limits discovery to electronic documents kept in the
ordinary course of business; otherwise, the costs shift to the

233. See id. (noting that by purging documents, companies may reduce storage
and retrieval costs of information assets). But see Simon Prop. Group v. mySimon,
Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 640 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (permitting the discovery of “deleted”
computer records).
234. See Rosenthal, supra note 73, at 33 (demonstrating that adversaries may try to
fool judges and opposing counsel into believing that large volumes of data are
unmanageable); see also Xpedior Credit Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston, Inc., 309
F. Supp. 2d 459, 465-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that, despite the inaccessibility of
the information requested, there was no justification to shift the costs to the
requesting party when compared to the total monetary stake under the Zubulake
test).
235. See Redgrave, supra note 21, at 211 (citing U.S. DIST. CT. WYO. L. R.
26.1(d)(3)(a) and U.S. DIST. CT. ARK. L. R. 26.1 to compare local rule requirements
that require parties to clarify what will be at issue during electronic discovery to
federal rules that lack such explicit requirements to resolve electronic discovery
disputes at the required federal Rule 26(f) pre-trial conference). As Redgrave points
out, the rule in Wyoming federal courts indicates that parties must meet and confer
about matters related to computer-based information, e-mail information, deleted
information, and back-up data during the federal Rule 26(f) conference. Id.
Likewise, he notes that the Arkansas rule requires parties to include in the pre-trial
conference report filed pursuant to federal Rule 26(f) “[w]hether any party will
likely be requested to disclose or produce information from electronic or computerbased media . . . .” Id. at 211 (citing U.S. DIST. CT. ARK. L. R. 26.1). See also In re
Bristol-Myers Squibb, 205 F.R.D. 437, 444 (D.N.J. 2002) (discussing the importance
of having a conference to prevent problems with electronic discovery), construed in
Redgrave, supra note 21, at 211.
236. See Schultz & Keena, supra note 170, at 25-26 (noting the differences between
local rules and the default pre-trial conference requirement under Rule 26(f)).
237. See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4 (requiring the requesting party to “specifically
request production of electronic or magnetic data and specify the form in which the
requesting party wants it produced”); MISS. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5) (stating that “the court
may also order that the requesting party pay the reasonable expenses of any
extraordinary steps required to retrieve and produce the information”).
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238

requesting party.
By contrast, where electronic materials are not
available in the ordinary course of business, yet the court finds there
is a sufficient need to compel production, Texas shifts the cost of
239
production to the requesting party.
The discretionary rules in federal courts governing cost-shifting
empower judges to decide where to allocate burden, even in cases
240
outside the scope of ordinary business. By contrast, the Texas rule
requires courts to shift costs if the data is not available in the ordinary
241
The Texas rule that insists on cost-shifting
course of business.
where requesting parties seek electronic documents not available in
the ordinary course of business would trump the Zubulake test for
242
state purposes.
The Texas rule offers a realistic approach that
anticipates the prohibitive costs inherent in electronic discovery for
files requested outside the scope of ordinary business and offers a
better guideline based on business purposes of records rather than
243
on the state of the information.
Other states address electronic
discovery by creating local rules that shift costs when the perceived
244
benefit fails to justify imposing such high costs during discovery. By
238. See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4 (indicating that the responding party must
produce electronic data “responsive to the request” and “reasonably available to the
responding party in its ordinary course of business”). By contrast, the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure do not include an express provision limiting requests for
electronic files kept in the usual course of business. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)
(allowing requests for the production of documents and things regardless of whether
kept during the ordinary course of business); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b) (specifying
that a party may produce documents as kept in the usual course of business or may
organize and label files according to the categories of the requesting party).
239. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4 (shifting costs to the requesting party for electronic
evidence beyond the regular course of business); see also Thomas Y. Allman, The Case
for a Preservation Safe Harbor in Requests for E-Discovery: Despite the Courts’ Increased
Attention to Dragnet Requests for Production of Electronic Materials, the Scope of Preservation
Should Be Addressed, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 417, 417 (2003) [hereinafter Safe Harbor]
(suggesting to the Federal Rules advisory committee that the Texas rule is working to
eliminate abusive requests for electronic materials).
240. See William T. Garcia et al., Electronic Discovery: Litigation and Antitrust
Enforcement in a Digital Age, 20 ACCA DOCKET 76, 82 (2002), available at
http://www.law.com/special/ supplement/e_discovery/litigation_enforcement.html
(June 18, 2002) (on file with the American University Law Review) (providing
commentary from Kenneth Withers, an expert who conducts studies for the Federal
Judiciary Center regarding electronic discovery, who noted that a judge may consider
the cost of retrieving information, the burden on the business, and the direct
relation of the information to the legal issues of the case, instead of requiring
document discovery or production simply because a document falls legally within the
scope of discovery).
241. TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4.
242. Id.
243. See Safe Harbor, supra note 239, at 417 (explaining that the party seeking
discovery may obtain information outside the bounds of ordinary business under
TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4, where sufficient necessity exists yet, must pay for the costs,
including the attorney costs).
244. See MISS. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5) (noting Mississippi includes a local rule that may
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focusing on business requirements rather than technical
requirements, these local and state rule alternatives solve the
245
problem of burdensome electronic discovery in a practical manner.
C. Straining Resources and Inducing Settlement
The prohibitive costs of discovering electronic information from
unduly broad data requests may encourage unnecessary
246
settlements.
When a requesting party seeks electronic data, this
strains IT staff resources, and the expense of performing the task of
247
retrieval may force settlement. Moreover, the producing party may
not use the tedious process of searching for records trapped in
248
various locations and formats as a shield during litigation.
249
and settle without
Most cases end without going to trial
250
substantial discovery.
Discovery costs may create unnecessary
shift costs to the requesting party where the request is beyond the ordinary scope of
business or fails to specify the format of the electronic information).
245. Id.
246. See Rubenstein, supra note 171, at 26 (finding the threat of increasingly high
discovery costs related to locating and retrieving electronic files may include sevenfigure price tags, thereby triggering otherwise unnecessary settlements); see also
Meade W. Mitchell, Discovery Abuse and a Proposed Reform: Mandatory Disclosure, 62
MISS. L.J. 743, 764 (1993) (showing that parties can gain economic leverage by using
discovery requests that force settlement); Charles Silver, What We Know and Do Not
Know About the Impact of Civil Justice on the American Economy and Polity: Does Civil Justice
Cost Too Much, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073, 2093 (2002) (demonstrating that litigants use
discovery tools to harass opponents with burdensome requests); COMMITTEE FOR
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, BREAKING THE LITIGATION HABIT: ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR
LEGAL REFORM 5 (2000), available at http://www.ced.org/docs/report/report_legal.pdf (reporting that discovery encompasses at least eighty percent of litigation costs).
247. See CIO CHALLENGE, supra note 127, at 6 (suggesting that the prohibitive cost
of searching for files not catalogued in Linnen v. A.H. Robins, No. 97-2307, 1999 WL
462015, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 16, 1999), a products liability case, forced
settlement because the requesting party sought to search 823 backup tapes for emails relating to fifteen employees at a cost of over one million dollars to the
producing party).
248. See Linnen, 1999 WL 462015, at *4 (noting that producing parties absorb
retrieval costs during discovery, despite the burdensome process and unmanageable
nature of the technology).
249. According to recent statistics, only 6,015 civil cases ended in trial in the U.S.
District Courts compared to the 259,537 cases terminated in 2002. LEONIDAS RALPH
MECHAM, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL CASES
COMMENCED, TERMINATED, AND PENDING DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPT.
30, 2002, 126 tbl.C-1, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/appendices/
c01sep02.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review); LEONIDAS RALPH
MECHAM, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL TRIALS COMPLETED, BY DISTRICT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPT.
30, 2002 162 tbl.C-7, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/appendices/
c07sep02.pdf (on file with The American University Law Review) (revealing a 2.3
percent trial rate in the 12-month period ending September 30, 2002 by
extrapolating the total number of civil cases terminated in 2002, which amounted to
259,537, compared to 6,015 total civil trials).
250. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery As Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 637 (1989)
(revealing a disheartening finding that most cases end in settlement and that parties
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pressure for parties to settle, regardless of the merits. Parties often
251
effectively using
inflate claims and distort settlement value,
252
253
Because settlement may not be ideal,
settlement as a weapon.
necessary alternatives afford litigants a way to resolve disputes in a
254
more balanced manner. As a last resort, a court may intervene and
grant a protective order if a plaintiff has a bad motive during
255
settlement.
Despite the producing party’s reduced ability to shift costs to the
requesting party and the increased incentive to settle during
electronic discovery disputes, the Zubulake limitation may provide
incentives for companies to create more organized business practices
256
and processes. The party with the most efficient information system
can ably respond to discovery demands because search and retrieval
of electronic files will be quick and effortless, thus reducing the
chance of unnecessary settlement.

who threaten discovery, but never use it, gain the most during settlement
negotiations).
251. See Kevin C. McMunigal, The Costs of Settlement: The Impact of Scarcity of
Adjudication on Litigating Lawyers, 37 UCLA L. REV. 833, 864-65 (1990) (noting how
settlement creates pressures to inflate claims).
252. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975)
(using discovery for in terrorem increment of settlement value); In re Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) (suggesting “blackmail settlements”
may force defendants to settle weak claims to avoid the threat of risky jury verdicts);
see also Hearings on H.R. 417 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Fin. of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 118, 120 (1994) (testimony of Donald C.
Langevoort, Lee S. and Charles A. Speir Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Univ. School of
Law) (arguing that unyielding discovery costs create incentives to settle meritless
claims to avoid expenses of discovery). But see Silver, supra note 246, at 2094
(arguing discovery costs increase based on complexity of case and case type and not
due to abusive behavior to drive settlement).
253. See Alschuler, supra note 190, at 1821-26 (suggesting settlement deprives
society of the benefits accompanying public adjudication).
254. See Easterbrook, supra note 250, at 646-47 (revealing an idea of loser-pays
system as an alternative to settlement to encourage more meritorious lawsuits
because it discourages frivolous lawsuits if the losing party has to pay); Charles B.
Craver, The Use of Non-Judicial Procedures to Resolve Employment Discrimination Claims, 11
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 141, 165 (2001) (offering an alternative to settling meritless
claims by using administrative proceedings to resolve employment disputes to avoid
costly litigation).
255. See Ellen M. Martin et al., Discovery Issues in Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 696 PLI/LIT 527, 557 (2003) (describing judicial intervention as a tool to
protect parties where the plaintiff has the motive to pressure the defendant into a
settlement).
256. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Electronic Records Management and Archives, 53 U. PITT.
L. REV. 963, 986-87 (1992) (suggesting document management systems may improve
the ability to search and retrieve files so long as properly implemented and
maintained).
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D. Updating Data Management Practices and Processes
Zubulake may force corporate counsel to reorganize document
management policies and procedures because producing parties
accessing multiple information systems will likely absorb the discovery
257
costs. Counsel must weigh the need for electronically discoverable
258
information against the cost of retrieval, review, and privacy. Since
information technology upgrades and document retention practices
already implemented are finally boosting productivity, there is an
additional advantage to create a more organized electronic filing
259
system.
This will likely result in financial savings beyond litigation
expense reduction and will improve the efficiency of the workforce
260
because data will be easier to access.
Moreover, understanding
weak links in an electronic system will enable corporate counsel to
261
better predict litigation costs and needs.
A well-organized document management system will ultimately
reduce litigation expenses through more efficient document retrieval
262
during discovery requests.
Accordingly, the most effective data
management system supports quick and accurate retrieval of
electronic information without compromising the structure of the
263
original file. By creating a data management strategy, collaborating
257. See supra Part II.B (hypothesizing that the inaccessibility test deters companies
with weak document management practices from shielding information systems from
discovery because Zubulake precludes cost-shifting for accessible yet complex data).
258. See Redgrave, supra note 21, at 209-11 (revealing the inherent judicial power
to shift costs in cases where the burden of discovery outweighs benefit). Counsel
should bear in mind, costs extend beyond litigation expenses and include exposure
to privileged information, and also include costs related to the technical expertise
required to access data. Id.
259. See Productivity, supra note 5, at 62-63 (finding that information technology
investment reaps its benefits years after implementation).
260. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Scientific Issues and the Function of Hearing Procedures:
Evaluating the FDA’s Public Board of Inquiry, 1986 DUKE L.J. 288, 325 (1986)
(highlighting that accessibility influences the ways in which agencies organize and
maintain records and will improve agency efficiency through easier access to
documents); see also Productivity, supra note 5, at 62-63 (suggesting IT has an impact
on productivity in that American labor productivity increased at an annual rate of
3.4% since 2000, attributable to the sharp increase in technology investment).
261. See Burke & Kummer, supra note 60, at 19-20 (finding that ready access to
computer records increases the ability to predict exposure and may save corporate
counsel millions of dollars by avoiding judgments, legal fees, and unnecessary
settlements).
262. See J. TIMOTHY SPREHE & HUMMINGBIRD LTD., ENTERPRISE RECORDS
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES S6-S7, at http://www.kmworld.com/publications/white
papers/records/humm-ingbird&sprehe.pdf (Sept. 1, 2003) (on file with the
American University Law Review) (discussing how records management strategies
may help reduce legal and financial risks and liabilities).
263. See D. Chad McCoy, A Long-Term Data Management Strategy Reaps Benefits, 4
ANDREWS E-BUS. L. BULL. 1, 3 (2003) (suggesting that document retrieval and
production requires long-term retention planning between the IT department and
general counsel so that information garnered is in a usable format).
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with business managers and information technology staff, and
establishing policies and procedures for document retention,
corporate counsel may help control litigation costs by reducing the
264
burden on staff to search, retrieve, and use electronic files.
Understanding where there are risks within electronic records will
265
Because the
further assist corporate counsel in managing costs.
Zubulake rule confines cost-shifting to inaccessible data, corporate
counsel armed with knowledge about data risks and document
retention requirements can better prepare for discovery requests and
forecast burdens.
Organizations need to maintain e-mail and other records for a
certain period of time. This period of time and management of
266
records is called document retention.
Various document and
267
record retention regulations exist that govern different industries.
Document retention policy requirements may vary according to
264. See Daryll R. Prescott et al., Electronic Data Balancing Act: Preserve or Delete?
Destroying Electronic Data Relevant To a Case Can Result in Severe Sanctions, But Total
Preservation May Also Cause Harm, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 17, 1998, at B7 (involving business
and IT staff to plan for data preservation based on the existing IT infrastructure and
business processes necessary for operations may reduce overall costs); CIO
CHALLENGE, supra note 127, at 4-5 (explaining the competing goals of IT personnel
and business executives that results in dangerous electronic records management
practices for companies whose IT personnel fail to collaborate with business
managers on record management systems). IT personnel aim to create an
inexpensive temporary copy of data to restore in case of failure and not for the
purpose of retrieval, whereas businesses seek to retain files for routine search,
discovery and retrieval. Id.
265. See Rae Cogar & R. Thomas Howell, Retention: More Important Than Ever. In
the Name of Compliance, BLT Presents Another Perspective on Dealing with Records, 13 BUS.
L. TODAY 44, 49 (2003) (suggesting that corporate counsel should reduce risks,
protect critical business assets, and respond to demands of discovery by monitoring,
auditing, and enforcing record management policies and procedures).
266. See generally Redgrave, supra note 21, at 206-07 (revealing the importance of
developing a records management program and offering document retention policy
guidelines).
267. See FEDERATION OF TAX ADMINISTRATION, MODEL RECORDKEEPING AND
RETENTION REGULATION: A REPORT OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE TASK FORCE ON EDI
AUDIT AND LEGAL ISSUES FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION 3 (Mar. 1996), available at
http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/modelreg. pdf (on file with the American University
Law Review) (describing requirements of IRS regulations for retaining electronic
records containing tax data drawing on IRS Revenue Procedure 91-59 governing
automated recordkeeping and accounting systems); see also Patrick R. Grady, Discovery
of Computer Stored Documents and Computer Based Litigation Support Systems: Why Give Up
More Than Necessary, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 523, 532-33 n.50 (1996)
(showing distinctions between industries that require ten to forty years for record
retention such as Banks and Banking, Business Credit and Assistance, Labor, and
Emergency Management and Assistance and those that require a length of six years
for record retention such as Commodity and Securities Exchange, Labor, Mineral
Resources, Money and Finance, and Public Health); see generally OFFICE OF THE
FEDERAL REGISTER NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, GUIDE TO
RECORD RETENTION REQUIREMENTS (Jan. 1, 1994) (noting record retention schedules
with triggering events that impact required length of record retention).
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industry and function of the department, but in general, courts
268
require a record retention policy to be reasonable. For example, a
company may not do indirectly what it cannot do directly by
delegating document retention policies to a third party to avoid
269
having to produce the documents upon request during litigation.
In addition, an organization may not claim privilege as a defense for
producing electronic data even though retrieving privileged files may
involve the added cost of a protective order for opposing counsel to
270
access privileged electronic files.
While document retention regulations may not distinguish
between electronic records and paper files, the increased capacity for
data storage renders electronic documents less expensive to store
271
than traditional documents.
However, corporate counsel may not
agree that reduced storage price demands increased information
272
storage because this would keep potential “smoking guns” around
that would be otherwise eliminated if the usual retention practices
273
were followed.
“Smoking guns” might be embedded deep within

268. See Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1988)
(requiring document retention policies to be adjusted to preserve records the
company believes may be subject to discovery requests); see also Grady, supra note
267, at 532-33 n.50 (listing different document retention policies according to
industry and function).
269. See S. Diagnostic Assoc. v. Bencosme, 833 So. 2d 801, 802 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002)
(“United Auto cannot avoid the mandate of Boecher by employing Southern
Diagnostic in an attempt to shield itself from inquiries about its relationship with its
experts.”).
270. See Playboy Enter. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1055 (S.D. Cal. 1999)
(permitting expert who specialized in the field of electronic discovery to review
electronic files despite exposure to privileged information because the benefit of
reviewing files coupled with the protective order ensuring confidentiality outweighed
the burden of exposing privileged information to expert).
271. See Christopher V. Cotton, Document Retention Programs for Electronic Records:
Applying a Reasonableness Standard to the Electronic Era, 24 J. CORP. L. 417, 418 (1999)
(arguing that the “tremendous capacity and efficiency” available by electronic means
should drive longer retention periods because of the reduced costs).
272. See Elissa R. Hoffman, Note, Smoking Guns, Stray Remarks, and Not Much In
Between: A Critical Analysis of the Federal Circuits’ Inconsistent Application of the Direct
Evidence Requirement in Mixed-Motive Employment Discrimination Cases, 7 SUFFOLK J.
TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 181, 197 (2002) (defining “smoking guns” as documents that
could determine the outcome of a case).
273. See Robins, supra note 1, at 423 (alluding to safeguards corporate counsel can
implement to help reduce the burden of electronic document retrieval such as
throwing away and destroying documents as part of a routine document
management policy in the course of ordinary business rather than keeping
unnecessary documents). But see Danis v. USN Communications, Inc., No. 98 C7482,
2000 WL 1694325, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2000) (finding culpable conduct where
the defendant, as Chief Executive Officer, had the authority and responsibility to
implement document management procedures, delegated the function to someone
who lacked experience, and failed to ensure that his company properly adhered to
the document management policy).
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old computer systems that are difficult to access, but are not
274
inaccessible.
Further, the hidden costs of old computer systems involve litigation
expenses that would not have to be made were it not for faulty
275
document retention practices.
By strategizing a solution to
information technology infrastructure concerns through a total data
preservation strategy, companies can reduce the amount of data
276
stored and reduce costs.
Coordinating internal efforts amongst
various business departments will ensure better document
277
management.
Corporate counsel can use technology to assist in
278
The additional
record retention and reduce litigation expenses.
benefit of organized data management includes the reward of
279
productivity improvements.
Historically, the need to compete
globally forced business process improvements, ultimately triggering

274. See Robins, supra note 1, at 415 (listing examples of complex electronic data
such as hidden files that do not appear when a document is printed, system history
that records when a document was accessed and edited, and source code “genealogy”
that tracks amendments and deletions to computer software).
275. See Rosenthal, supra note 73, at 32, 35 (indicating that many companies use a
mix of new and old technologies and will bear the costs of retrieving data from
“legacy systems,” a term for old computer systems); see also M. Lewis Kinard, Beware
the Underlying Costs of Using Dated Technology, N.Y.L.J., July 21, 2003, at T3, available at
http://www.law.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/Pre
view&c=LawArticle&cid=1058416408946 (last updated Aug. 14, 2003) (on file with
the American University Law Review) (suggesting that companies pay hidden costs
by not upgrading information systems to newer and easier to access technologies
although the upfront cost of implementing the new software systems requires initial
investment); Redgrave, supra note 21, at 204 (explaining the cost of doing business
in the computer age falls on the producing party).
276. See Prescott, supra note 264, at B7 (reducing the amount of data preserved
requires an understanding of technology infrastructure and ownership interests of
the business managers responsible for the information within the databases).
277. See Redgrave, supra note 21, at 207 (proposing that an electronic records
management program should include: training management about document
retention in the ordinary course of business; creating practices and customs for
individual business units geared to business needs; setting limits and communication
policies about the use of e-mail and other technology systems; implementing policies
and procedures with an understanding of how business units work together to
preserve data; and increasing awareness of how data preservation will impact current
and future litigation); MICHAEL R. OVERLY, E-POLICY: HOW TO DEVELOP COMPUTER, EMAIL, AND INTERNET GUIDELINES TO PROTECT YOUR COMPANY AND ITS ASSETS 91-96
(1999) (recommending six essentials to every good corporate technology-use policy
including: (1) eliciting an understanding that the computer belongs to the business;
(2) explaining privacy interests; (3) explaining what types of monitoring will occur;
(4) emphasizing to use care when drafting e-mails; (5) explaining that employees
must avoid inappropriate content; and (6) requiring sign-off on computer and email-use policy).
278. See Ruth A. Tressel & Daniel J. Noonan, Using Technology to Fend Off Future
Legal Crises, 21 ACCA DOCKET 87, 97 (2003) (showing that new technologies can help
counsel isolate relevant electronic files to ensure speedy investigation).
279. See Productivity, supra note 5, at 61 (suggesting that productivity improvements
are finally coming to fruition).
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better data management in order to efficiently operate and retrieve
280
information.
Despite some process improvements, the reality of business
information systems and document retention policies today is
281
disorganized.
Business executives do not know how to search for
information and need to rely on the information technology
manager to retrieve, maintain, archive, and be in command of the
282
information. Additionally, there is a general reluctance by business
managers to deal with litigation strategies for electronic discovery
283
because of their lack of awareness of how technology works.
The global reach of information technology and the
corresponding document management systems may involve privacy
laws outside of the United States. In addition, it could put a further
damper on maintaining records and managing the costs of electronic
284
discovery. When developing electronic document retention policy
280. See James Flanigan, Should We Fear High-Pay Job Shift?, LA TIMES, June 22, 2003,
at C1 (explaining the need to globalize information support by moving jobs overseas
for businesses to remain competitive in the market-driven economy). Standardizing
document management practices and ensuring worldwide employees can easily
access, exchange, and produce files offers a business challenge but also a discovery
challenge in order to manage the costs of accessing electronic data in worldwide
locations. Id. See also Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc., 218 F.R.D. 416, 421-23 n.7 (D. Del.
2003) (involving a potential cost-shift for a review of technology in European offices
dating back to 1981); David M. Hudanish, Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity in
an Evolving Regulatory Framework, 767 PLI/PAT 633, 640 (2003) (suggesting stringent
European data protection legislation requires mandatory compliance with standards
for disaster recovery planning and business continuity practices which may impact
how to conduct electronic discovery overseas).
281. See Heidi L. McNeil & Robert M. Kort, Discovery of E-Mail and Other
Computerized Information, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Apr. 1995, at 18 (arguing that large companies
often fail to organize computer files in a coherent fashion, fail to implement a formal
document retention policy, and lack a catalogued system for backup files, and that
users within the companies do not properly organize files, resulting in a burdensome
task of sifting through disorganized data when served with discovery requests).
However, after the Enron debacle and resulting legislation, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002), business organizations care much
more about information management techniques because of the increased attention
to good-faith retention policies. See Daniel E. Toomey & Tamara M. McNulty,
Sarbanes-Oxley: How It Will Affect Contractors and Sureties, 23 CONSTR. LAW. 32, 38
(2003) (suggesting investment in systems and policies or electronic document
retention will prevent greater costs and problems in the future in the event of
litigation or government investigation).
282. See Jerold S. Solovy & Robert L. Byman, Digital Discovery, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 27,
1999, at A16 (noting that business executives may lack the expertise needed to
search and locate electronic files, particularly for data residing in older computers
and backup files).
283. See Ashby Jones, What a Mess! For Corporations, Pileup of Electronic Data Could Be
Trouble Waiting to Happen, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 2, 2002, at C6 (revealing that many
companies are unwilling to confront and understand technology, still operate
departments as if still paper-based, and are generally uncomfortable with electronic
discovery requests).
284. See Julius Melnitzer, Keeping Track of the Invisible Paper Trail: What Legal
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guidelines, corporations need to consider the international
285
ramifications and how to effectively implement such policies.
Furthermore, companies who seek to play fair and maintain moral
standards will be better off by creating document retention strategies
286
that do not compromise corporate integrity.
Companies across
most industries must retain electronic files for the required length of
287
time to conform to regulations.
Information technology
departments may retain electronic files for longer than necessary
because of a misunderstanding regarding the impact of keeping stale
documents around, thus spawning a need for legal departments and
information technology departments to coordinate procedures and
288
practices regarding the duration of document retention.
CONCLUSION
As a result of the Zubulake decision, the cost of electronic discovery
is less likely to shift to the requesting party, adding substantial burden
to the litigation process. Cost-shifting will be limited at the expense
of fairness in litigation. In the end, the increased economic leverage
gained by requesting parties during discovery will only add to the
costs society must pay to support such litigious behavior.
Management of costs in electronic discovery should not evolve to a
rule based on inaccessibility just because it may increase judicial
efficiency. A practical approach would be to question whether
electronic discovery requires an extraordinary step beyond the
Departments Can Learn from Boeing’s Experience, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 2003, at 15,
available at http://www.cltmag.com/editorial/technology/feb03.cfm (on file with
the American University Law Review) (exemplifying electronic data retrieval
problems faced by large global corporations that operate fragmented technology
systems scattered throughout the world through the Boeing case study). Dealing
with global offices may require a difference level of review for privileged information
in the United States as compared with the European Union. Id.
285. See Kathleen M. Porter et al., Work Station or Purgatory? Steps Toward a Company
Policy on E-mail and Using the Net, 11 BUS. L. TODAY 59, 59-60 (2002) (suggesting that
electronic communications program should include: a written policy about personal
and professional use of e-mail and the Internet; employee education about how to
properly use and the risks of misuse of technology; mechanisms to reduce the
company’s liability relating to employee’s use of technology; and procedures that
enable auditing the electronic communications program).
286. See Rosenthal, supra note 73, at 33-34 (highlighting that data deletion and the
failure to implement an effective document retention policy may result in sanctions
and an instruction to the jury to infer that the documents were purposefully
deleted).
287. See Grady, supra note 267, at 532-33 n.50 (listing required duration of record
retention by CFR statute title).
288. See Prescott, supra note 264, at B7 (noting the competing interests of IT
personnel who perceive data storage costs as low and who focus on the form of data
preserved and general counsels’ concern with high costs of discovery and
unnecessary litigation liability as an aftereffect of preserving too much data).
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ordinary course of business and to look at cost-shifting based on the
totality of the circumstances. State and local rules offer a sensible
alternative and provide for the discovery of electronic information
only if it is kept in the ordinary course of business. Moreover, local
rules anticipate the need to identify electronic discovery issues early
during the pre-trial conference.
The potential impact of Zubulake may encourage broad requests
during electronic discovery and thus will spark much-needed
restructuring of information systems practices and processes in order
to avoid unnecessary risk. Information technology departments
across the country will therefore be required to reorganize practices
and processes in order to reduce litigation costs. A carefully crafted
data management plan will ensure easy accessibility to information
and will enable corporate counsel to better predict litigation costs to
avoid unnecessary settlement.
A more flexible threshold test that takes care to consider the
equities of the case rather than the format of the file squares with the
interests of justice. One of the obvious challenges courts will face if
other circuits follow the Zubulake decision will be defining
inaccessibility. Determining accessibility will require education and
training of the judiciary regarding the complicated technical topic of
289
accessing electronic data.

289. See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 196, at 16-17 (suggesting education and
training of judiciary regarding electronic discovery concepts and issues ranks as a key
problem discovered in the study).

